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Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against
Terror
Kent Roach and Gary Trotter*
I.

Introduction

Although much has been written since the September 11 terrorist
attacks about how far states should go in combating terrorism, much less
has been written about the risks of harming the innocent in the war
against terror. Indeed, the very metaphor of a war against terror suggests
a willingness to accept some collateral damage.' Reduction of the
freedom of citizens is typically cited as the most common form of
collateral damage, and much of the debate about anti-terrorism measures
has revolved around threats to civil liberties. 2 In this paper, we will
begin to examine how various anti-terrorism measures taken in a number
of countries may increase the risk of another type of collateral damagemiscarriages of justice. In addition, we will explore the significance of
the war against terror for what is classified as a miscarriage of justice. In
particular, recent American anti-terrorism efforts-such as the detention
of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, the use of detention under
immigration laws, the detention of people under material witness
* Of the Faculties of Law, University of Toronto and Queens University
(Kingston) respectively. This paper is part of a larger and on-going comparative study of
miscarriages of justice. The financial assistance of Canada's Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also to Rayner
Thwaites for excellent comments on an earlier draft of this article, as well as the
participants in Russ Weaver's Criminal Procedure Forum held in Louisville in
November, 2004, and the University of Minnesota's Law School seminar series in
January, 2005. As this article was being completed, Professor Dianne Martin, who was a
pioneer in Canada for the study of and advocacy against wrongful convictions,
unexpectedly passed away. Her death leaves a large hole and we respectfully dedicate
this article to her memory.
1. For an epidemiological study estimating close to 100,000 additional deaths in
post-invasion Iraq, see Les Roberts et al., Mortality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of
Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey, LANCET, Oct. 29, 2004, at http://image.thelancet.com/
extras/04art I0342web.pdf.
2. See, e.g., the creation of a Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in § 1061
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458
§§ 7211-14 (2004).
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warrants, and the designation of American citizens as enemy
combatants-raise the issue of whether the conceptualization of
miscarriages of justice as the wrongful criminal conviction of the
factually innocent is too narrow. That is, should deprivations of liberty
short of the criminal conviction of those who are innocent under the
relevant law be classified and studied as miscarriages of justice? Can
concerns about the punishment of the innocent be applied to immigration
and military laws that employ detention as a preventive measure? How
does the context of the war on terrorism inform the debate about what is
a miscarriage of justice and the efforts that are necessary to minimize the
risk of miscarriages of justice?
The British experience with wrongful convictions in the
Birmingham Six, the Maguire Seven, the Guildford Four and the Judith
Ward cases provides dramatic evidence about the danger of convicting
the innocent as a response to terrible acts of terrorism. Wrongful
convictions in all cases are corrosive to the integrity of the justice
system, but they are particularly corrosive in terrorism cases. As in the
so-called Irish cases in the United Kingdom, miscarriages of justice may
be taken as a partial affirmation of some of the political or other
grievances of the terrorists. This is particularly so if democracies that
claim to abide by the rule of law and equal rights and justice for all do
not live up to these ideals when they are threatened by terrorism. The
temptation of departing from normal legal standards and engaging in prejudgment, prejudice, and stereotyping may be particularly high in
emotive and devastating cases involving allegations of terrorism and
fears of continued acts of terrorism.
The need to maintain legal standards of fair treatment and to ensure
the just and accurate determination of individual responsibility are
particularly important if democracies are to maintain the high ground in
their fight against terrorists. The punishment of the guilty, and only the
guilty, is one of the important distinctions between the force that a
democracy should use to defend itself against terrorists and the force that
terrorists themselves use. 3 In addition, the risk of wrongful convictions
in terrorism cases, both before and after 9/11, are likely to fall
disproportionately on particular groups, such as racial and religious
minorities, or those with radical political views. Thus, even if you accept
3. Section 102(a)(3) of the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 276
(2001), includes a finding of Congress that "the concept of individual responsibility for
wrongdoing is sacrosanct in American society, and applies equally to all religious, racial
and ethnic groups."
On the sometimes fine distinctions between terrorism and
counterterrorism, see Laura Donohue, Terrorism and Counterterrorist Discourse, in
GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (V. Ramraj, M. Hor & K. Roach eds.

(forthcoming)).
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that the risk of wrongful convictions can never be reduced to zero, there
may be a special case
for taking additional precautions to reduce this risk
4
in terrorism cases.

In the first part of this paper, we review the experience of wrongful
convictions in terrorism cases, with special attention to the so-called Irish
cases of the Birmingham Six, the Maguire Seven, the Guildford Four,
and Judith Ward, who were all wrongfully convicted of IRA bombings.
These cases provide evidence of the many pressures that may be brought
to bear on the criminal justice system in high profile and emotive
terrorism cases. For example, they demonstrate how police misconduct
can generate false confessions and false evidence that is used against
others thought to be connected with a terrorist cell. They reveal the
effect that tunnel vision can have on those who prosecute terrorism cases,
including supposedly objective forensic scientists, judges, and juries.
These cases also reveal how a common factor in wrongful convictionsthe failure of the state to make full disclosures of information to the
accused-can be a special risk in complex terrorism cases where the
state is reluctant to disclose information that may affect national security.
We also examine how broad criminal laws relating to terrorism,
including new post 9/11 anti-terrorism criminal laws, executive
designation of terrorists and terrorist groups, and reliance on
circumstantial evidence may encourage a process of guilt by association
that may run the risk of convicting the factually innocent. We conclude
that the above factors, as well as the pressure to reassure the public after
a terrible act of terrorism, generate real risks that factually innocent
people, especially innocent associates of terrorists, may be charged and
perhaps wrongfully convicted of terrorism. As in the Irish cases, such
wrongful convictions, if eventually discovered, will shake the public's
confidence in the criminal justice system and be seen as an affirmation of
state discrimination against those who may share political beliefs,
national or ethnic origins, and/or the same religion as the terrorists.
Despite the above risks of wrongful convictions in terrorism cases,
we are not able to point to specific examples of confirmed or suspected
wrongful convictions since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
In Germany and the United States, prosecutions of those alleged to have
participated in the September 11 plot have been thwarted or stalled
because of an unwillingness to disclose intelligence sources to the
accused. Lack of full disclosure was a significant cause of wrongful
convictions in the Irish cases, and insistence on disclosure is an
important safeguard against future wrongful convictions. At the same
4.

RONALD DwoRKN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 88 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, The

Threat to Patriotism.NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS. Feb. 28. 2002.
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time, the due process requirements of the criminal trial have placed
considerable pressure on many states to use less restrained alternatives to
the criminal law. The less restrained alternatives include the use of
military power, immigration laws, and other laws that are not designed to
punish the guilty.5 In the second part of this paper, we will examine
some of these alternatives to criminal prosecutions to determine whether
concerns about miscarriages of justice are transferable from the criminal
context to these alternative proceedings.
Many western countries have used immigration laws as an
important means to apprehend and detain terrorist suspects. This method
has been used in the United States, most infamously in the round-up
conducted immediately after September 11. About a thousand people
were detained in this round-up, but no criminal charges relating to
September 11 were subsequently brought.6 After September 11, the
United Kingdom's government derogated from fair trial rights to enact a
new law that authorized the indefinite detention of non-citizen terrorist
suspects who could not be deported because of concerns that they would
be tortured upon their return This use of the immigration law to deal
with terrorism has recently been declared by the House of Lords to be
both disproportionate and discriminatory given the limits of deportation
as an anti-terrorism device and the fact that the extraordinary and
draconian powers of indefinite detention only apply to non-citizens. s In
Canada, only one criminal charge under a new Anti-Terrorism Act 9
enacted after 9/11 has been brought against a suspected terrorist who
happened to be a Canadian citizen. Instead, the government has used a
number of security certificates under immigration law which allow for
the indefinite detention of terrorist suspects until they can be deported
5.

PHILIP HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT

WAR 91-98 (2003).
6. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: IMMIGRANTS RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22-47 (2003); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 1 1 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT
OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE SEPTEMBER 11

ATTACKS (2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm; see also THE
MAZE OF FEAR: SECURITY AND MIGRATION AFTER 9/11, 11 (John Tirman ed., 2004).

7. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).
8. A (FC)and others (FC) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004]
UKHL 56. This important decision under the Human Rights Act, 1998 did not, however,
result in the striking down of the relevant provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and
Security Act, 2001, but rather constitutes a declaration of their incompatibility with the
rights and derogation provisions of the act and by implication of the fair trial rights and
derogation provisions in Articles 5 and 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The British government has allowed the indefinite detention to lapse, but enacted new
legislation providing for control orders that could apply to terrorist suspects who are both
non-citizens and citizens/ Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005 c.2 (Eng.).
9. Anti-Terrorism Act, ch. 41, S.C. 2001 (Can.).
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and for the government to present evidence affecting national security to
a judge without the evidence being disclosed or even summarized for the
detainee.' 0 Unlike the United Kingdom, Canada has not ruled out the
possibility of deporting terrorist suspects even if there is a risk that they
will be tortured upon their return." Post 9/11, many countries have
found immigration law to be preferable to the criminal law as a means to
detain and incapacitate terrorist suspects.
Other procedural shortcuts have been used in the war against
terrorism. An unknown number of terrorist suspects have been detained
in the United States under material witness warrants. 2 Perhaps the
bluntest alternative to the criminal law in the war against terrorism has
been the use of military power and military law to detain terrorist
suspects. There is a real concern that people who are factually innocent
of terrorism and involvement with the former Taliban government in
Afghanistan may have been detained at Guantanamo Bay.
The
government's claim that it could use its power to detain enemy
combatants without judicial review was dealt a blow in the Supreme
Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush, which asserted habeas corpus
jurisdiction over the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. 3 In the companion
case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which dealt with an American citizen, Justice
O'Connor, writing for a plurality of the Court, discussed the
requirements of due process in the context of a citizen who is alleged to
be an enemy combatant.' 4 This judgment inspired new rules that were
quickly issued in July, 2004, establishing combatant status review
tribunals to determine whether detainees at Guantanamo Bay have been
properly classified as enemy combatants.
We will critically examine the dangers presented by Justice
O'Connor's judgment in Hamdi and the new rules in producing
inaccurate determinations of fact about whether someone is an enemy
combatant or a terrorist. We recognize that it has not been common in
the past to apply concerns about miscarriages of justice and the
punishment of the innocent outside of the criminal justice context.
Nevertheless, we believe that it is necessary to do so given the
prominence of alternatives to the criminal law as a means of dealing with
10. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ch. 27 §§ 77-88 (2001) (Can.). See
generally, KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA (2003); Kent
Roach, Canada's Response to Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY

(V. Ramraj, M. Hor & K. Roach eds., forthcoming).
11. Suresh v. Canada, [2002] S.C.R. 3.
12. One study reported that 43 people were held under these warrants in the first 14
months after 9/11 and that almost half never testified in any proceeding. COLE, supra
note 6, at 37.
13. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2696 (2004).
14. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649-50 (2004).
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suspected terrorists since 9/11, as well as the length of detentions in what
appears to be a war against terrorism without a foreseeable end.
Detention of suspected terrorists under military and immigration law
may not technically depend on formal findings of guilt, but they may
have a similar effect on those who are detained. Indeterminate detention
may in some respects be even harsher than most punishments that would
follow criminal convictions for acts of terrorism.1 5 In addition, we note
that the risk of error in depriving someone of liberty is an important
factor in the Mathews v. Eldridge test' 6 that Justice O'Connor applied in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,17 and one that should also have been considered in
the drafting of the rules to determine the status of the detainees at
Guantanamo.
In the final part of this paper, we return to the issue of what should
constitute a miscarriage of justice in a post-September 11 world where
there is an increased use of less-restrained alternatives to criminal
prosecutions. We argue that post-September 11 experiences point in the
direction of broadening what has traditionally been conceived of as a
miscarriage of justice beyond the field of wrongful convictions that result
from criminal prosecutions.
We take as a starting point a broad
definition of miscarriages of justice provided by a leading British
scholar, Professor Clive Walker, which includes many rights violations
that would fall short of wrongful convictions of the factually innocent.
At the same time, we are sensitive to the risk that too broad a definition
of miscarriages of justice will diminish the legal, moral, and political
salience of the powerful term. In the end, we will propose a definition
that is narrower than Professor Walker's, but one that can apply to the
prolonged detention of the innocent under military and immigration law.
In determining what constitutes innocence outside of the criminal
law context, we will focus on the risk of error in applying relevant legal
criteria for detention without assessing the justice of the criteria. In other
15. In the course of holding that the combatant status review tribunal rules violate
the 5th Amendment guarantee of due process, Judge Green has observed that that

government"
[H]as been unable to inform the Court how long it believes that war on
terrorism will last... . Indeed, the government cannot even articulate at this

moment how it will determine when the war on terrorism has ended. At a
minimum, the government has conceded that the war could last several
generations, thereby making it possible, if not likely, that 'enemy combatants'
will be subject to terms of life imprisonment at Guantanamo Bay ....
Short of
the death penalty, life imprisonment is the ultimate deprivation of liberty, and

the uncertainty of whether the war on terror-and thus the period of
incarceration-will last a lifetime may be even worse than if the detainees had
been tried, convicted, and definitely sentenced to a fixed term.
In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 2005 WL 195356, at *19 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2005).
16. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
17. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646-47 (2004).
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words, our definition of a miscarriage of justice will not engage the
legality under either international or domestic law of the definition of
who is an enemy combatant or who is an inadmissible alien because of
involvement with a terrorist group. Rather, our focus will be on the
injustice of detaining a person who is innocent under the existing
statutory definition of an enemy combatant or an inadmissible alien. On
the basis of this admittedly positivistic definition of miscarriages of
justice, we conclude that security certificate immigration proceedings
used in Canada to detain and deport terrorist suspects and the new rules
used by the American military to determine whether the Guantanamo
Bay detainees are enemy combatants run a serious risk of producing
miscarriages of justice. In other words, they run the risk of detaining
people who in fact do not satisfy the definition of inadmissible and
removable aliens in immigration law, or of enemy combatants provided
in the relevant military order.
As has been the case with wrongful convictions and the death
penalty, we hope that the focus on factual innocence under our proposed
definition of a miscarriage of justice will generate bi-partisan concern
from those who may both agree and disagree on the substantive justice of
the rules relating to the detention of inadmissible aliens and enemy
combatants. In other words, even if you believe that the detention of an
inadmissible alien or an enemy combatant is justified and legal, you
should be concerned about the wrongful detention of a person who is in
fact not an inadmissible alien or an enemy combatant. At the same time,
we do not mean to suggest that the broad grounds for detention of
inadmissible aliens or enemy combatants are necessarily just. A focus on
miscarriages of justice and factual innocence either in criminal law or its
less restrained alternatives only
examines a partial, albeit important and
18
compelling, facet of justice.
II.

Terrorism and the Risks of Wrongful Convictions

Terrorism is unfortunately a world-wide phenomena, and much can
be learned from the comparative experiences of other countries'
responses to terrorism. In many cases, the lessons learned will be lessons
18. Much of the advocacy against the Guantanamo detentions has not focused on the
risk of detaining the innocent, but rather on the injustice of the rules of indefinite
detention themselves. This may suggest that a focus on innocence under the rules laid
down may have the indirect effect of legitimating the detention and punishment of those
who are factually guilty under such rules. If true, this might suggest that advocacy
against wrongful convictions in the United States and elsewhere might have the indirect
and often unintended effect of helping to legitimate the use of the criminal sanction and
the death penalty in cases where factual guilt is clear because of DNA evidence or
perhaps other factors. This is an important possibility that should be examined, but it is
beyond the scope of this paper.
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to be avoided.' 9 In Northern Ireland, it has been estimated that 3,636
lives have been lost to political violence between 1966 and 1999, with
another 121 being killed during that time in Great Britain. 20 New
criminal laws against terrorism were enacted in the United Kingdom as a
response to a series of IRA bombings in 1974 and in Omaagh in 1998."
In the United States, new terrorism laws were created in reaction to the
murder of Leon Klinghoffer upon the Achille Lauro when it was
hijacked by the PLO in 1985, as well as in response to the bombing of
the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City bombing in
1995.22 By its very nature, terrorism creates fear and anxiety that23fuels
society to take decisive measures to catch and punish the terrorists.
Societies dealing with terrorism and the fear of terrorism are liable
to forget not only that past anti-terrorism laws have not made them safer,
but also that they have contributed to miscarriages ofjustice. The United
Kingdom suffered from much terrorist violence in the 1970s, most of it
involving bombings by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The acts
qualified under most definitions of terrorism because they targeted and
killed civilians and they were committed for the purposes of compelling
the government to act. British anti-terrorist efforts also resulted in
miscarriages of justice.
In the non-terrorism context, a miscarriage of justice imposes
wrongs on those wrongfully convicted. Society also suffers because the
wrongful conviction of an innocent person means, by definition, that a
guilty person goes free. Miscarriages of justice can be even more
harmful in terrorism cases if they are seen as legitimating the grievances
of terrorists. In other words, a miscarriage of justice in a terrorism case
can contribute to the destabilizing effects of the actual terrorist acts. The
British experience with wrongful convictions in the so-called Irish cases
shook British confidence in the administration of criminal justice and
were seen by many as evidence of discrimination against the Irish, as
well as a symbol of a heavy-handed approach that seemed to inspire
deeper and more bitter grievances. After his release, Brandon Mayfield
19.

Geoffrey Bennett Legislative Responses to Terrorism-A View from Britain 109

PENN ST. L. REV. 947 (2005).
20.

CLIVE

WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO ANTI-TERRORISM

LEGISLATION

1

(2002).
21. Philip Thomas, September 11 and Good Governance, 53 NORTHERN IRELAND L.
Q. 366 (2002); Philip Thomas, 9/11: USA and UK, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193 (2003).

22.

Laurie McQuade, Note and Comment, Tragedy as a Catalyst for Reform: The

American Way? 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 325 (1996).

23. For a recent and controversial proposal to recognize the role of preventive
detention as a "reassurance" strategy that may be necessary after devastating terrorist
attacks, see Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1037
(2004). On the flawed psychology of the risk perception of terrorism, see, Cass Sunstein,
Terrorism and ProbabilityNeglect, 26 J. OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 121 (2003).
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argued that his false identification as a terrorist connected with the
Madrid bombing was connected to the fact that he was a convert to
Islam. Revelations of wrongful convictions in the war against terrorism
may be seen by some as confirmation that the west is engaged in an
indiscriminate war against Islam, just as the wrongful convictions in the
Irish cases were seen by some as confirmation of prejudice against the
Irish.24 Even though he maintains that there is no right to the most
accurate process possible for determining guilt, Ronald Dworkin has
stressed that collective policy decisions about the level of accuracy in
criminal or civil processes should not "discriminate against some
independently distinct group., 2 5 Leaving aside the difficult issue of
whether
the
risks
of wrongful
convictions
generally
fall
disproportionately on less powerful groups, the risk of wrongful
convictions in terrorism cases would seem to fall disproportionately on
various distinct groups. Professor Dworkin, for one, has argued that the
risks to civil liberties, including the detention of the innocent, from post9/11 measures have not been evenly distributed and impose particular
harms on Muslims and Arabs. 6
A.

The Irish Cases

In 1975, the Birmingham Six were convicted of murder arising from
the 1974 pub bombings that killed twenty-one people, injured 160
people, and lead to the quick enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism
Act. They were arrested by the police on the night of the bombings en
route to the funeral of an IRA bomber in Belfast. They were convicted
on the basis of confessions, circumstantial evidence linking them to other
Republicans, including the bomber whose funeral they were to attend,
and forensic evidence that seemed to demonstrate that they had handled
explosive substances. They claimed that the confession evidence had
been beaten out of them. It was clear that the men had been assaulted in
custody, but the question was whether they had been assaulted before or
after they made incriminating statements. The trial judge determined
that their confessions had been voluntarily obtained and admitted their
statements. The jury convicted the six men of twenty-one counts of
murder.
The six men-Patrick Hill, Gerry Hunter, Richard McIlkenny, Billy
Power, Johnny Walker and Hughie Callaghan-sought, but were denied,

24.

On the importance of perceptions in the war against terrorism, see, THE

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES,

COMMISSION REPORT § 12.3 (2004).
25. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 4 at 88.
26. Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism,supra note 4.

9/11

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal after they were convicted. Prison
officials were also charged with the assaults occurring while the men
were in custody, but were acquitted.
The six men subsequently
commenced a civil action against the police, claiming damages for the
assault. The courts dismissed this civil suit as an abuse of process and a
collateral attack on the criminal verdict. In his judgment for the Court of
Appeal, Lord Denning made the following infamous statement:
Just consider the course of events if this action were to proceed to
trial. It will not be tried for 18 months or two years. It will take
weeks and weeks. The evidence about violence and threats will be
given all over again, but this time six or seven years after the event,
instead of one year. If the six men fail, it will mean that much time
and money and worry will have been expended by many people for
no good purpose. If the six men win, it will mean that the police
were guilty of perjury, that they were guilty of violence and threats,
that the confessions were involuntary and were improperly admitted
in evidence: and that the convictions were erroneous. That would
mean that the Home Secretary would have either to recommend they
be pardoned or he would have to remit the case to the Court of
Appeal under section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. This is
such an appalling vista that every sensible person in the land would
say: It cannot be right that these actions should go any further....
This case shows what a civilized country we are. Here are six men
who have been proved guilty of the most wicked murder of twentyone innocent people. They have no money. Yet the state lavished
sums on their defence. They were convicted of murder and sentenced
to imprisonment for life. In their evidence they were guilty of gross
perjury. Yet the state continued to lavish sums on them-in their
actions against the police. It is high time that it stopped. It is really
an attempt to set aside the convictions27 by a side-wind. It is a scandal
that it should be allowed to continue.
The use of the civil process, even though unsuccessful in this case,
demonstrates some of the potential of "jurisdictional redundancy ' '28 in
providing alternative routes to challenge criminal convictions that may
turn out to be wrongful. In this respect, it is interesting to note that
British nationals who have been released from Guantanamo Bay,
including the Tipton Three-Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel
Ahmed-are suing Donald Rumsfeld and the United States government
for mistreatment while in custody at Guantanamo Bay.29
27. Mctlkenny v. Chief Constables of the West Midlands, 1980 Q.B. 283, 323 (Eng.
C.A.).
28.

Robert M. Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology and
WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 648-49 (1981).
Vikram Dodd, Guantanamo Britons sue Rumsfeld, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 28,

Innovation, 22
29.
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Although the civil action in the Birmingham Six case was stopped
as an abuse of process, controversy over the convictions continued, and
the Home Secretary referred the case back to the Court of Appeal in
1987 to consider fresh evidence relating to two issues: whether the men
had been mistreated in police custody at the time they made
incriminating statements, and whether the scientific evidence linking the
men with explosives was credible. The Court of Appeal, however,
dismissed the new appeal, dismissively characterizing the men's
allegations of mistreatment as "a wide-ranging conspiracy involving all
the many policemen concerned to create a false case against them by
means of torture and perjury" and concluding that "we have no doubt
that these convictions were both safe and satisfactory. 3 °
However, the controversy over the convictions continued, and in
1990 a different Home Secretary referred the case back to the Court of
Appeal for a second time because of new evidence that suggested that
police notes had not been taken contemporaneously and new scientific
evidence that indicated that the test for explosives was not reliable. The
Director of Public Prosecutions concluded that neither the scientific
evidence nor the confession evidence was reliable, thus he would not
seek to sustain the conviction. The Court of Appeal then decided that the
convictions were unsafe and unsatisfactory, and the men
were eventually
31
released in 1991 after serving sixteen years in prison.
The Guildford Four were convicted of murder in 1975 for pub
bombings by the IRA in 1974 that killed seven people. An appeal taken
in 1977 failed on the basis that alibi evidence, including claims by others
that they had committed the bombings, was not convincing given the
confessions. In 1989, the Home Secretary referred the case back to the
Court of Appeal after new scientific evidence was discovered indicating
that police reports were not taken contemporaneously with the alleged
confessions. New evidence also emerged about an alibi witness and
other exculpatory evidence that was not disclosed.
In 1989, the
convictions were quashed after the Director of Public Prosecutions
2004, at 4. Note that in another similarity with the Irish cases, a movie about the three is
also being contemplated.
Vanessa Thorpe, Tipton Three Set for Big Screen, THE
OBSERVER, Jan. 23, 2005, at 6.
30. R. v. Callaghan, 88 Cr. App. R. 40, 47 (1989).
31. R. v. McIlkenny, 93 Crim. App. R. 287 (1991). The Court of Appeal concluded:
[T]hat in light of the fresh scientific evidence, which at least throws grave
doubt on Dr. Skuse's evidence, if it does not destroy it altogether, these
convictions are both unsafe and unsatisfactory.
If we put the scientific
evidence on one side, the fresh investigation carried out by the Devon and
Cornwall Constabulary renders the police evidence at the trial so unreliable,
that again we would say that the convictions are both unsafe and unsatisfactory.
Adding the two together, our conclusion was inevitable.
Id. at 318.
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decided not to contest the convictions of the four: Paul Hill, Carole
Richardson, Gerald Conlon and Patrick Armstrong. A public inquiry
was subsequently dramatized
also was made into the case, 32 and the case
33
into a movie, In the Name of the Father.
The Guildford Four case was also related to that of the Maguire
Seven, who were convicted in 1976 of possessing explosives. The
convictions rested on the basis of forensic tests that showed traces of
nitroglycerine, even though no explosives were found. The Maguire
Seven included Gerald Conlon's aunt, Anne Maguire, and his father,
Giuseppe Conlon, who died in prison in 1980. Gerald Conlon, part of
the Guildford Four, allegedly confessed to the police that his aunt had
taught him how to make bombs. Most of the Maguire Seven were
sentenced to terms of imprisonment of fourteen years. In 1987, the
Home Secretary refused to refer the Maguires' case to the Court of
Appeal on the basis that he had no doubts about the scientific evidence
linking them with explosives.34 Subsequent tests carried out at the behest
of the public inquiry, however, revealed the possibility of innocent
contamination, as well as the fact that not all of the scientists' notes had
been disclosed to the defense at the original trial. In 1991, the Home
Secretary referred the case back to the Court of Appeal with the Director
of Public Prosecutions conceding that the convictions were unsafe. The
Court of Appeal quashed the convictions on the basis "that the possibility
of innocent contamination cannot be excluded and on this ground alone,
we think that the convictions of all of the appellants are unsafe and
unsatisfactory.... 3 5 The Maguires insisted that no explosives had been
in the house and complained that the Court of Appeal's innocent
contamination theory did not constitute a full exoneration.36
The May public inquiry sided with the Maguires over the Court of
Appeal by endorsing statements by the Maguires' counsel that the
"Crown's case, as presented at trial was so improbable as to be frankly
incredible." Lord May explained the wrongful conviction as following
from frequent references in the Guildford Four trial to the Maguires'
residence as a "bomb factory." He concluded:
32. SIR JOHN MAY, REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
THE CONVICTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE BOMB ATTACKS IN GUILDFORD AND WOOLWICH IN
1974, FINAL REPORT (1993-94 H.C. 449).

33. A. Logan, In the Name of the Father,144 NEW L.J. 244 (1994).
34. Joshua Rozenberg, Miscarriagesof Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER STRESS,
91, 99-100 (Eric Stockdale et al. eds., 1992).
35. R. v. Maguire 94 Cr. App. R. 133, 152-153 (1992). The Court of Appeal also
indicated that forensic scientists advising the prosecution had a duty to disclose "material
of which he knows and which may have 'some bearing on the offence charged and the
surrounding circumstances of the case."' Id.at 147.
36. Rozenberg, supra note 34, at 102-03.
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[T]he "bomb factory" assumption pervaded the entire case and was
allowed to obscure the improbability of what was alleged against the
Maguire Seven. I do not criticize the jury: the context of the
prevailing bombing campaign and the atmosphere of the trial are
likely to have made it impossible for them to make a wholly objective
37
and dispassionate appraisal of the admissible evidence alone.
In less diplomatic terms, the jury was influenced by tunnel vision, fear,
and stereotypes. The connection between the Guildford and Maguire
cases illustrates how the cell nature of modem terrorism, when combined
with unreliable interrogations and forensic evidence, can lead to multiple
and related miscarriages of justice.
The final case involved Judith Ward, who was convicted in 1974 of
murder and causing an explosion causing twelve deaths, including those
of two children, on an Army coach. She was also convicted at the same
time of two other IRA bombings. Like the previous cases, the bombings
were part of a series of bombings by the IRA during 1973 and 1974, and
the conviction was obtained on the basis of incriminating admissions by
the accused and forensic evidence linking the accused with explosives.
Judith Ward was open about her Republican sympathies, though she did
not admit to being an active member of the IRA. In 1991, the Home
Secretary referred her case to the Court of Appeal, in part because the
forensic evidence linking her to the explosives had been given by the
same scientist that had been involved in the Birmingham Six case. Ward
was released in 1992 with the Court of Appeal ruling that "the disclosure
of scientific evidence was woefully deficient" and deliberate nondisclosure by governmental forensic scientists had resulted in an unfair
trial.38 The Court of Appeal also concluded that the forensic evidence
relied upon by the Crown at trial was unreliable. Finally, the Court of
Appeal indicated that Ward's confession was unreliable. Unlike the
other IRA cases, there was no allegation of police abuse or mistreatment;
Ward's confession was problematic because of her own mental
instability.3 9
37.

SIR JOHN MAY, SECOND REPORT ON THE MAGUIRE CASE, at 9.2, 9.13 (Dec. 3,

1992).
38. R. v. Ward, 96 Crim. App. R. 1, 51 (1993). Noting that such standards applied at
the time of the 1974 trial, the Court of Appeal defined the duty of disclosure broadly:
An incident of a defendant's right to a fair trial is a right to timely disclosure by
the prosecution of all material matters which affect the scientific case relied on
by the prosecution, that is, whether such matters strengthen or weaken the
prosecution case or assist the defence case. This duty exists whether or not a
specific request for disclosure of details of scientific evidence is made by the
defence. Moreover, the duty is continuous: it applies not only in the pre-trial
period but also throughout the trial.
Id. at 50.
39.

Id.; see also Clive Walker, Miscarriagesof Justice in Principleand Practice, in
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Police Misconduct, False Confessions, and False Statements

These cases demonstrate many of the classic features of
miscarriages of justice, as well as some that are more prominent in the
terrorism context. A theme that runs through most of the cases is police
misconduct. Police misconduct can manifest itself at many stages of a
criminal investigation or prosecution. The Irish cases reveal that the
interrogation process is particularly vulnerable to this type of abuse,
especially when there is no electronic recordings of interrogations. 40 The
horrors of terrorism make the police vulnerable to the idea that abusive
means in interrogating suspected terrorists are justified by the noble end
of punishing and preventing the killing of innocent civilians. The horrors
of terrorism in the Irish cases should not be underestimated. Between
October, 1974 and December, 1975, there were thirty-five terrorist
bombings in the England. Lord May concluded that "having regard to the
public outrage and concern over these bombings . . .I would not have
been surprised if any police force had adopted a hostile approach to each
of the Guildford Four." 41 In the Irish cases, police misconduct resulted
in both false confessions and false statements that incriminated
associates of the detainees.
False confessions have long been recognized as a contributor to
wrongful convictions. There is a growing body of literature on why false
confessions occur and the frequency of false confessions.42
False
confessions are generally associated with police misconduct and the
mistreatment of suspects. This was explicitly recognized in the Canadian
context in the case of R. v. Oickle,43 in which Justice Iacobucci for the
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada said, "Fortunately, false
confessions are rarely the product of proper police techniques. As Leo &
Ofshe (1998) point out, false confession cases almost always involve
'shoddy police practice and/or police criminality.' ' 44 At the same time,
MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR 31, 48 (Clive Walker & Keir

Starmer eds., 1999).
40. See Walker, supra note 39, at 46-49; see also C. RONALD HUFF ET AL.,

70-73 (1996.).
41. Sir John May Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Convictions Arising out of the Bomb Attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974 Final
CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT-WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY

Report (1993-94 H.C. 449) at 14.1, 21.13,

42. For example, see Richard Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 302 (1986); Richard Leo, Police Interrogationand Social Control, 3
Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 93 (1994); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:
SafeguardsAgainst Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 151-53
(1997); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 449-54 (1998).
43. R. v. Oickle, [2000] S.C.R. 3.
44. Id. at 30.
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proper interrogation practices can still result in false confessions,
especially from those who are suffering from a mental disorder.
The application of extreme interrogation techniques makes it more
likely that terrorist suspects will make false confessions and false
incriminating statements about their associates. As discussed above, this
process occurred as interrogation of members of the Guildford Four
produced information that led to charges against the Maguire Seven.
Lord May in his public inquiry report recommended that the jury be
warned about the dangers of false confessions with a specific and
stronger warning that "against the background of a terrorist bombing
campaign such as there was in 1974/75, and the consequent public
demand for the arrest and conviction of those responsible, there may be
pressure on the police to induce persons accused to confess by conduct
which is not acceptable. Further, when the police feel certain that they
have indeed arrested the right people, perhaps on the basis of what is
regarded as reliable intelligence, but have little or no admissible evidence
to prove their guilt, there may be a strong temptation to persuade those
persons to confess., 45 Lord May correctly identified the dangers of
convicting accused terrorists solely on the basis of confessions, but his
suggestion that warnings to the jury about the dangers of false
confessions may prevent miscarriages of justice discounts the fact that
the jury in the Guildford Four trial was already warned of the danger of
false confessions 46 but convicted in any event on the basis of the false
confessions. Stronger remedies such as the exclusion of unreliable
evidence obtained through extreme interrogation are necessary.
It is disturbing that while debate is raging in the legal academy
about whether torture is a proper approach in some terrorism cases,4 7
relatively little attention has been given to the obvious risk that a person
who is being tortured or being subject to extreme interrogation
45. Sir John May Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Convictions Arising out of the Bomb Attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974 Final
Report (1993-94 H.C. 449) at 21.17.
46. Id. at 12.21.
47. Alan Dershowitz recognizes that some might criticize his proposal for torture
warrants on the grounds that it "is 'well known' that torture does not work-it produces
many false confessions and useless information, because a person will say anything to
stop being tortured." He then recounts a case where torture did apparently produce lifesaving information and dismisses the concern by concluding "that torture sometimes
works, even if it does not always work. No technique of crime prevention always
works."
ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS 136-37 (2002).
Professor
Dershowitz does not mention the Irish cases discussed in this paper. For an argument
about the risk of torturing the wrong person, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical
Torture in the "War on Terrorism, " J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y. (forthcoming). See

also In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 2005 WL 195356, at *26 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2005)
(holding that "due process requires a thorough inquiry into the accuracy and reliability of
statements alleged to have been obtained through torture.").

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

techniques may falsely incriminate himself and others in an attempt to
satisfy the interrogator and stop the abuse or otherwise provide unreliable
and false information.
One report has, however, surfaced from
Guantanamo indicating that after three months of solitary confinement at
Camp Delta, initial denials, and continued interrogation, three men
falsely confessed to have been at a meeting between Mohamed Atta, the
leader of the 9/11 hijackers, and Bin Laden in Afghanistan. These
confessions were only discovered as false after British intelligence
discovered documentary evidence that the men could not have been in
Afghanistan at the relevant time.4 8
Proper interrogation techniques cannot eliminate the danger of false
confessions. Judith Ward's incriminating statements were accepted as
made voluntarily and without police coercion, but they were
subsequently revealed to have been unreliable. The Court of Appeal
observed that "in our experience, cases in which it is accepted that a
confession was made and was made voluntarily but nevertheless it is
asserted that the confession was wholly untrue are rare in the extreme.
This of course is such a case.",49 The problem of false confessions in that
case was aggravated by non-disclosure of "wild and untrue" statements
made by Ward, as well as by non-disclosure of evidence about her
mental condition and the failure of the defense to call its own psychiatric
evidence.5 °

C. Tunnel Vision
An element that binds many of the causes of wrongful convictions
together is the concept of "tunnel vision,, 51 defined as the "singleminded and overly narrow focus on a particular investigative technique
or prosecutorial theory, so as to unreasonably colour the evaluation of
information received and one's conduct in response to that
information." 52 This phenomenon is recognized elsewhere as a cause of
miscarriages of justice.53 It is particularly problematic in the terrorism
48.

Neil Katyal, Executive andJudicialOverractionin the Guantanamo Cases, 2004

SuP. CT.REV. 49 at 65. Professor Katyal suggests that cautionary instructions should be
given to panels reviewing detention when the only evidence supporting continued
detention is from the detainee himself, and that panels should be assisted by non-voting
security intelligence and mental health experts. Id. at 65-66.
49. R. v. Ward, 96 Cr. App. R. 1, 58 (1993).
50. Id. at 59-60, 67.
51.

See HON. F. KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING GuY PAUL

MORIN (1998). On this inquiry, see Kent Roach, InquiringInto Wrongful Convictions, 35
CRIM. L. BULL. 152 (1999).

52.

KAUFMAN,

supra note 48, at 1137.

53. See Dianne L. Martin, The Police Role in Wrongful Convictions-An
International Comparative Study, in WRONGLY CONVICTED-PERPECTIVES ON FAILED

JUSTICE 77 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2003).
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context when it is fused with prejudice and stereotyping of groups who
are associated with terrorism. Professor Dianne Martin identifies certain
pre-disposing factors, including the commission of an odious crime, that
places great pressure on the police and prosecutorial authorities to
convict.5 4 Combined with a marginalized or odious accused person, the
recipe for tunnel vision is complete. The late Professor Martin cited the
Irish cases (horrible crimes and ethnic marginalization) as a perfect
example of when tunnel vision is likely to occur. 55 In the post-9/1 1
terrorist context, where crimes of unspeakable magnitude are committed
in a context in which ethnicity, race, and religion are ascendant
considerations, the danger of tunnel vision is exacerbated.
Tunnel vision is particularly likely to occur in cases where false
confessions have been obtained from detainees. The Guildford Four
contended that they made false confessions in response to assaults,
threats of assaults and threats of violence against their families. They
were also deprived of sleep, food and drink while being subject to
extensive questioning. They told the police what they wanted to hear in
the hope that the questioning would stop. Lord May adverted to the
close connection between false confessions and tunnel vision when he
concluded in his public inquiry report that "one should not underestimate
the impact which apparently full confessions may have upon the conduct
of an investigation. Because a confession may be false it is essential for
the police, lawyers and courts to consider other evidence on its merits
independently of that confession and be cautious before relying upon it
at face value. I am quite satisfied that in a number of respects this need
for caution was neither understood nor followed in the case of the
Guildford Four.",56 Harsh interrogation techniques combined with
stereotypes that associate detainees with terrorism because of their
ethnicity or religion are a virtual recipe for investigative and
prosecutorial tunnel vision that ignores exculpatory evidence.
D. The Role of Experts: Problems of Tunnel Vision and Lack of
Disclosure
Tunnel vision is not limited to police and prosecutors who may
focus on a suspect and refuse to accept evidence pointing away from
guilt. It may also corrupt evidence-based scientific methods The British
experience with the Irish cases demonstrate that state scientists who
54. Id. at 85.
55. Id. at 83-87.
56. Sir John May Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Convictions Arising out of the Bomb Attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974 Final
Report (1993-94 H.C. 449) at 21.21, 21.10-21.11.
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provided expert evidence on the presence of nitroglycerine were both
incompetent in carrying out the tests and dishonest in failing to disclose
false-positive test results. 57 The archetypal, impartial expert witness may
be a dying breed. The English Court of Appeal observed in the Ward
case:
For lawyers, jurors and judges a forensic scientist conjures up the
image of a man in a white coat working in a laboratory, approaching
his task with cold neutrality, and dedicated only to the pursuit of the
scientific truth. It is a sombre thought that the reality is sometimes
different. Forensic scientists may become partisan. The very fact
that the police seek their assistance may create a relationship between
the police and the forensic scientists. And the adversarial character
of the proceedings tend to promote this process. Forensic scientists
employed by the government may come to see their function as
helping then police. They may lose their objectivity. That is what
must have happened in58 this case. It is illustrated by the catalogue
which we have set out.
The terrorism context can move experts further away from the ideal of
impartiality.
In other words, experts may understandably (though
wrongly) come to see themselves as part of the official response to the
war on terror, rather than the dispassionate and wise sources of technical
knowledge we need.
In the Birmingham Six case, the prosecution's expert, Dr. Skuse,
relied on positive results from a preliminary field-screening test, the
Griess test, for nitroglycerine.
Two more sophisticated tests were
conducted in the laboratory, one that indicated no contact with
nitroglycerine, and one that indicated contact for only one of the
accused-a contact that was subsequently found to be possible from
contact with other sources, including cigarettes. The Court of Appeal
found that "Dr. Skuse said he regarded the positive result on Hill's left
hand as confirming his Griess result. Instead of being 99 percent certain,
he was now 100 percent. He did not regard the negative GCMS results
on Power's and Hill's right hands as undermining the previous positive
Griess results, even though, as we have seen, the GCMS is a thousand
57. See Walker, supra note 39, at 46-48.
58. R. v. Ward, 96 Cr. App. R. 1, 51 (1993). Similarly, in a case involving the
admissibility of opinion evidence proffering "novel science," the Supreme Court of
Canada offered the following cautionary tone:
This notion has long disappeared and now the "professional expert witness" has

emerged. Although not biased in a dishonest sense, these witnesses frequently
move from the partiality generally associated with professionals to advocates in
the case. In some notable instances, it has been recognized that this lack of
independence and impartiality can contribute to miscarriages ofjustice.
R. v. D.D., [2000] S.C.R. 275, 299-300.
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times more sensitive than the Griess test.' '59 Such dismissals of
contradictory evidence are a sign of tunnel vision in which authorities
simply refuse to consider evidence that a suspect may be innocent.
A further complicating factor may be an inequality in the
availability of experts. The state may have essentially unlimited access
to salaried or even hired experts, while the defense may have limited
funds to hire experts and may distrust salaried experts who work in state
laboratories. At their trial, the Birmingham Six called a young expert,
Dr. Black, who testified about the frailties of the Griess test relied upon
by Dr. Skuse, the Crown's senior expert. The trial judge suggested to the
jury that Dr. Black's concerns about the Griess test were a result of his
"own theorising" and that if they preferred Black's evidence:
[T]hen you will obviously conclude that the forensic evidence of Dr.
Skuse is of no value. Indeed Dr. Black's theory logically seems to
imply not only that Dr. Skuse's theories were of no value, but that Dr.
Skuse has been spending and must have spent much of his
professional life wasting his time ....
Do you think that Dr. Skuse
has been wasting most of his professional time? It is a matter entirely
for you.60

The Court of Appeal, which finally overturned the 1975 convictions in
1991, observed:
A disadvantage of the adversarial system may be that the parties are
not evenly matched in resources. As we have seen, one reason why
the trial judge expressed his preference for Dr. Skuse was that Dr.
Black had carried out no experiments to prove his theory.
Experiments presumably cost money. Whether Dr. Black could have
carried out experiments within
the limitation of legal aid, or the time
61
available, we do not know.
In major terrorism cases, the state will have access to unlimited
resources, while the accused may only have minimal legal aid funding.
Even if the accused could gain access to increased funding, many may be
reluctant to help fund a defense because of concerns about broad laws
against financing terrorism and laws that allow the freezing of property
believed to belong to terrorists or their supporters.
The Court of Appeal in the Birmingham Six case stated that one
response to the unequal access to experts problem is to require the
prosecution to disclose all information in its possession. As discussed
below, this was originally not done in the Birmingham case and

59.
60.
61.

R. v. McIlkenny, 93 Cr. App. R. 287, 296 (1991).
Id. at 297.
Id. at 312.
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contributed to the wrongful conviction. Another response is for the state
or the judge to commission supposedly neutral scientific evidence. This
was also done in the Birmingham case, but the Court of Appeal was
reluctant to rely on such new evidence because it had not been subject to
cross-examination. 62 Inquisitorial elements have some promise as a
response to failures of the adversarial system that may result in
miscarriages of justice. 63 At the same time, however, adversarial systems
may resist such transplants and see them as improper intrusions on the
adversarial system.
A more inquisitorial approach may, however, also lend itself to the
problems of tunnel vision. In the Brandon Mayfield case, a number of
experts, including a court-appointed expert, initially confirmed a false
match of his fingerprints with those found in Madrid despite Mayfield's
claims that he had not been out of the United States. Fortunately, this
mistake was corrected, but the fact that it persisted for a number of
weeks confirms that experts, including those appointed by the court, may
be subject to error.
The failure of experts in miscarriages of justice, particularly in the
Irish cases, raises questions about whether our faith and reliance is
properly placed on experts in the criminal justice system. Mounting
experience suggests that it is not. 64 However, writers and advocates are
inconsistent in their regard for science in the criminal process, being
quite willing to unquestionably accept the conclusions yielded by DNA
analysis. 65 In the Irish cases, science played a role both in the wrongful
convictions and their discovery, as it was scientific tests that revealed
that police notes were not taken contemporaneously with alleged
confessions and that the tests for explosives were vulnerable to false
positive tests.66 Indeed, some argue that the judges who overturned the
convictions made over-confident conclusions about the scientific validity
of the exonerating scientific evidence, just as the judges and juries who
convicted the accused over-confidently relied on the scientific validity of
the incriminating evidence. 67 Wrongful convictions raise the thorny
issue of the often intractable difficulties of discovering the truth and the
62.
63.

Id. at 313.
D. Givelber, The Adversary System and HistoricalAccuracy: Can we do Better?
in WRONGLY CONVICTED-PERPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 47 (Saundra D. Westervelt &
John A. Humphrey eds., 2003).
64. See Gary Edmond, Constructing Miscarriages of Justice: Misunderstanding
Scientific Evidence in High Profile CriminalAppeals, 22 O.J.L.S. 53 (2002).
65. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL
(1996); JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES OF THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED (2000).

66.
67.

Rozenberg, supra note 34, at 105-06.
See Edmond, supra note 64.
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proper institutional and moral assignment of doubts about the truth.
E. Judges and Juries
It is not just the investigative and prosecutorial authorities who must
shoulder the entire burden of miscarriages of justice. Judges and juries
may also be at fault, including an appellate process that can make
allegedly wrongful convictions difficult to review and that defers
excessively to the verdicts of juries. In the Birmingham Six case, the
trial judge reviewed the evidence for the jury in a way that favored the
prosecution. For example, he suggested that marks on the accused,
especially scratches on the chest, were likely self-inflicted,68 and that a
prison doctor who testified that the police had inflicted the injuries was
likely guilty of perjury. 69 He also suggested to the jury that if the
accused's testimony was to be believed "there is no escape from the fact
that the police are involved in a conspiracy to commit a variety of crimes
which must be unprecedented in the annals of British criminal history. ' 7 °
The appellate courts did not at first correct the miscarriages of justice,
and in many of the cases were faced with prosecutorial concessions that
the convictions were unsafe. The appellate courts place excessive weight
on fresh evidence and are reluctant to reevaluate problematic findings of
fact by the jury.

71

Juries may also play a role in wrongful convictions. Juries, by
design, represent a majority of citizens, and the majority may feel
particularly threatened by terrorism and hostile to those accused of
terrorism or other emotive crimes. In Britain, at the time of the Irish
cases, jurors were selected without extensive voir dires into the attitudes
or prejudices that they might bring to a case.72 Even in jurisdictions that
68. The trial judge, Justice Bridge, posed the following leading question to the jury:
"If a man wants to inflict injuries on himself, what more obvious place in which to do it
than by scratching his chest?" Clive Walker, The Judiciary, in MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR 203, 227 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds.,
1999).
69. The trial judge told the jury:
Can you believe one single word of what Dr. Harwood says? There are
inescapably many perjurers who have given evidence. If Dr. Harwood is one
of them, is he not the worst?... If this man has come to this court to give you
false evidence, he is certainly not fit to be a member of the honourable
profession upon which, by perjuring himself, he has brought terrible shame.
Id. at 227. On the differences between the British and Canadian practices of elaborate,
and at times, leading judicial instructions to the jury, and more bare-boned American
instructions, see M.L. Friedland and Kent Roach, Borderline Justice: Choosing Juries in
the Two Niagaras,31 ISRAELI L. REV. 120 (1997).
70. Walker, supra note 68, at 227.
71.
RICHARD NOBLES & DAVID SCHIFF, UNDERSTANDING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE

ch. 3 (2000).
72.

For an argument that the racist viewpoints of a juror may have contributed to a
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do allow such inquiries, jury panels may often not include groups such as
non-citizens. In addition, minorities may also be underrepresented. In
this vein, it is significant that Lord May, in his review of the Maguire
Seven case, concluded that the jury convicted the accused despite an
improbable case being offered by the prosecution. Although he was
quick to say that he did not criticize the jury, he implicitly did so by
suggesting that "the context of the prevailing bombing campaign and the
atmosphere of the trial are likely to have made it impossible for them to
make a wholly objective and dispassionate appraisal of the admissible
evidence alone. 73 The fact that juries do not give reasons for their
verdict may also increase the likelihood that stereotypes will influence
their deliberations and verdicts.
F.

Disclosureand Public Interest Immunity

The Irish cases demonstrated that a failure to disclose relevant
evidence is often a significant factor in miscarriages of justice. Lack of
disclosure can occur at the level of police officers and prosecutors, and
even those working behind the scenes in crime laboratories. The sheer
complexity and multi-jurisdictional nature of many terrorism
investigations may also create situations where, deliberately or
inadvertently, evidence that ought to be disclosed to the defense is not
disclosed. In the Judith Ward case, which involved allegations of three
bombings, four different police forces were involved, even though
Britain has a far more centralized police structure than either the United
States or Canada. 74 In addition, there were disclosure problems with
prosecutors and forensic scientists. The trend in many current terrorism
investigations is towards the involvement of multiple police forces and,
the mixing of police and intelligence agencies. Each agency may have
its own standard operating procedure with respect to disclosure, and
material that should be disclosed may fall through the cracks.
A failure to make full disclosure has led the United States Attorney
to agree to a motion for a new trial in which two men, Karim Koubriti
and El Maroudi, were convicted by a Detroit jury of material support of
terrorism in June of 2003. 7 The government conceded in August of
2004 that it had failed to disclose evidence that there was no initial
wrongful conviction in Canada, see KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS' RIGHTS:
THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 251-56 (1999).

73. MAY, supra note 37, at 9.2, 9.13.
74.
Kent Roach and M.L.Friedland, Borderline Justice: Policing in the Two
Niagaras 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 241 (1996).

75.

Government's Consolidated Response Concurring in Defendant's Motion for a

New Trial August 31, 2004 at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/uskoubriti

83104g.pdf
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consensus about alleged targets and that it had failed to disclose photos
of the alleged targets, resulting in misleading evidence being led at trial.
The government also conceded that it had failed to disclose alternative
theories held within the Armed Forces, the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to explain tapes that the
government had alleged were designed to case various targets for
terrorism. It also conceded that it failed to disclose impeachment
evidence concerning a jailhouse informer who testified that the accused
were involved in terrorist plots. Finally, it conceded that the prosecutor's
closing arguments that stressed the harm that terrorism could cause to
innocent people was unduly prejudicial to the accused.
This case
demonstrates a combination of failure by multiple police and intelligence
agencies to make full disclosure with both tunnel vision which
suppresses exculpatory interpretations of the evidence, reliance on
jailhouse informers and the danger of prejudice against accused who
were presented to the jury as Islamic extremists. The Koubriti case
fortunately also demonstrates an eventual recognition by prosecutors of
their responsibilities to make full disclosure.
A related factor that may make terrorism cases more risky for
wrongful convictions is that they are more likely to result in claims of
public interest immunity over evidence that might normally be disclosed
to the accused. In the Judith Ward case, the Court of Appeal observed
that the prosecution had taken it upon themselves to make decisions
about non-disclosure of sensitive information in the public interest. In
the face of this finding, the Court of Appeal stressed "the rule that the
court and not the litigant must be the ultimate judge of where the balance
of public interest lies must always be applied by the prosecution in
criminal cases. 76 The Court of Appeal added that "if, in a wholly
exceptional case, the prosecution are not prepared to have the issue of
public interest immunity determined by the court, the result must
inevitably be that the prosecution will have to be abandoned., 77 As will
be seen in subsequent parts of this paper, states have abandoned or
sacrificed criminal prosecutions since 9/11 in order to ensure that
national security intelligence is not made public or disclosed to the
accused. Nevertheless, the concern about maintaining the secrecy of
such information has not, as suggested by the Court of Appeal in the
Ward case, led to the abandonment of attempts to detain terrorist
suspects. Rather, it has encouraged the state to use immigration and
military laws, which are more protective of state secrets and place less
demanding disclosure obligations on the state.
76.
77.

R. v. Ward, 96 Cr. App. R. 1, 27 (1993).
Id. at 57.
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Writing in 1999, Professor Clive Walker observed that public
interest immunity claims were increasing because of the greater role of
security intelligence in the policing of terrorism, as well as the increased
role of the collection of intelligence in policing.78 This trend has only
increased since 9/11, with greater emphasis on information sharing
between police and intelligence agencies within jurisdictions, as well as
sharing between states. In many cases, foreign and domestic intelligence
agencies may share evidence with the police, but strenuously object to
the disclosure of such information to the accused. These objections may
make alternative military or immigration proceedings attractive because
of reduced disclosure obligations.
In Canada, public interest immunity was expanded in the AntiTerrorism Act, 79 which was enacted a few months after the September 11
terrorist attacks. The grounds of public interest immunity apply to
"sensitive information" relating to international relations, national
defense, or national security of the type that the government is taking
measures to safeguard. The law also provides new duties on all justice
participants, including the accused, to bring potential disclosures to the
attention of the Attorney General. 80 Even if a specially designated
reviewing judge has determined that the public interest in disclosure
outweighs the possible injury to international relations, national defense,
or national security, 81 the federal Attorney General can still issue a
certificate prohibiting disclosure of the information. 82 There is a limited
right to review this certificate before another specially designated judge;
however, this judge may only overturn the certificate if he or she
concludes that it does not relate to matters affecting international
relations, national defense, or national security. 83 This limited right of
review was only introduced after objections were raised about
unreviewable executive powers when the bill was first introduced. 84
Once an Attorney General's certificate has been sustained as
relating to national security or defense information, or information
obtained in confidence from a foreign body, no judge can go behind the
certificate or order that the information be disclosed. A trial judge in a
criminal trial, however, retains the explicit right to order whatever
78. Clive Walker & Geoffrey Robertson, Public Interest Immunity and Criminal
Justice, in MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR 170, 171-72 (Clive
Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1999).
79. Anti-Terrorism Act, ch. 41, S.C. 2001 (Can.).
80. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., ch. C-5, § 38.01 (1985) (Can.).
81. Id. § 38.06.
82. Id. § 38.13.
83. Id. § 38.131.
84. Hamish Stewart, Public Interest Immunity after Bill C-36, 47 CRIM. L.Q. 249
(2003).
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remedy is necessary to ensure the fairness of the trial without the
85
disclosed evidence. This remedy can include a stay of proceedings.
The new powers have been applied in a few cases with judges ordering
some evidence disclosed and some evidence not disclosed and the
Federal Court of Canada suggesting that evidence affecting national
security may only be disclosed when the accused's innocence is at stake.
86 Even if the Federal Court decides that the evidence must be
disclosed
to the accused because his innocence is at stake, the Attorney General
can override a judicial disclosure order with a national security
certificate. To be sure, even this certificate is subject to some judicial
review and the criminal trial judge retains the right to stay proceedings if
he or she determines that a fair trial is impossible. Nevertheless, concerns
have been raised that the reviewing Federal court judge, who is not the
criminal trial judge, is not in a good position to judge the relevance of the
evidence or its usefulness to the defense. 7 In turn, the trial judge may be
left in the difficult, if not impossible, position of determining the effect
on the fairness of a criminal trial of evidence that he or she cannot
examine. It is not inconceivable that judges could be influenced by the
public outrage that would result should they terminate the prosecution of
a suspected terrorist in a notorious case.
The ability of the state to assert broad public interest immunity
claims in terrorism cases raises concerns about miscarriages of justice
because it restricts the flow of information to the accused. Given that
inadequate disclosure was an important factor in the Irish cases, the risk
of wrongful convictions in terrorism cases will increase with legislative
enactments that restrict disclosure in the name of national security and
exchange of information with foreign agencies.
G. CircumstantialEvidence and Intelligence
Another factor that may make terrorism cases particularly
susceptible to wrongful convictions is the reliance placed on
circumstantial evidence and intelligence that links suspects to other
known or suspected terrorists. As discussed above, abusive interrogation
in the Guildford Four case led to false claims implicating the Maguire

85. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C., ch. C-5, § 38.14 (1985) (Can.). Note, however,
that this power applies only in criminal trials and not in immigration proceedings, which,
as will be discussed below, can result in a person's detention and deportation.
86. In one case involving criminal charges of hostage taking in Bosnia, four reported
decisions have already been made with respect to the accused's access to evidence. See
Ribic v. Canada, [2002] F.C. 290; Ribic v. Canada, [2002] F.C. 839; Ribic v. Canada,
[2003] F.C. 10, aff'd [2003] F.C. 246; Ribic v. Canada, [2003] F.C. 43.
87. Peter Rosenthal, Disclosure to the Defence After September 11: Sections 37 and
38 of the CanadaEvidence Act, 48 CRaM. L.Q. 186, 199-204 (2004).
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Seven. A person faced with abuse may falsely implicate a known
associate.
The cell nature of modem terrorism also encourages
prosecutors to offer evidence about a person's associates as evidence of
that person's participation in terrorist activities.
Canada's AntiTerrorism Act specifically provides that evidence of the accused's
political or religious motive to engage in terrorism is relevant, as is
evidence that an accused "frequently associates with any of the persons
who constitute the terrorist group" 88 is relevant evidence in determining
that the accused is guilty of the new offence of participating in the
activities of a terrorist group. Such provisions, as well as the emphasis
placed on the accused's associates in many terrorism cases, blurs the line
between security intelligence data collected by agencies unconcerned
with guilt and evidence that is traditionally used to prove guilt in a
criminal trial. Lord May noted that the police relied on intelligence data
linking some of the Guildford Four to anti-army activities in Northern
Ireland but warned that "it is in the nature of intelligence obtained from
informants that it often cannot be verified. There is also a risk that
information may be invented or embellished to gain greater rewards or to
89
inculpate an innocent person for ulterior motives.,
Terrorism prosecutions places pressures on the distinction between
intelligence data and probative evidence. Even within the setting of a
criminal trial, circumstantial evidence is often important in terrorism
cases. The respected English barrister Louis Blom-Cooper Q.C. has
closely examined the circumstantial evidence linking the Birmingham
Six with the bombings. The six were all acquainted with James McDade,
an IRA bomber who was killed a week before the Birmingham bombings
when a similar bomb he was working on prematurely exploded. Indeed,
five of the men were departing for McDade's funeral in Belfast when the
bombs exploded. Blom-Cooper defends the value of circumstantial
evidence in criminal trials and concludes that even when the unreliable
confession and forensic tests are excluded, "I am not in a position to
88. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., ch. C-35, § 83.01(l)(b), 83.18(4) (1985)
(Can.). Evidence of association and political and religious motive was also considered in
the trial of two men in Canada charged with but recently acquitted of murdering 329
people killed in the 1985 bombing of an Air India airliner. This trial was conducted under
the ordinary criminal law and not under the new anti-terrorism provisions of Canada's
Criminal Code that require proof of religious and political motive and allow association
evidence. One factor in the acquittals in this terrorism case may have been that the case
was tried by a judge alone and not by a jury who probably would have been more
influenced by the motive and association evidence. R. v.Malik and Bagri 2005 BCSC
350
89. Sir John May Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Convictions Arising out of the Bomb Attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974 Final
Report (1993-94 H.C. 449) at 3.7.
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answer the question whether the six men are or are not innocent of the
crimes committed on November 21, 1974. '' 90 Blom-Cooper has a valid
point about the difficulty of concluding whether someone is innocent, but
in our view he underestimates the dangers of relying on circumstantial
evidence in terrorism cases, where political and cultural associations,
perhaps combined with stereotypes or lack of knowledge about the
community, may facilitate a process of guilt by association. There may
be a case for reviving warnings about the use of circumstantial evidence
in terrorism cases by pointing out to the jury the possibility of innocent
associations. 91
H. Substantive Criminal Law
In terrorism cases, the nature of the substantive criminal law may
also produce increased risks of wrongful convictions. Accomplice
liability allows juries to find the accused guilty, even in the absence of
evidence that the accused actually perpetuated the crime. Although the
accused have to commit some act of assistance with the required fault
level, there is a danger in the hands of the police, and even a jury, that
accomplice liability can be distorted into something akin to guilt by
association. Conspiracy laws may also present a risk that all who are
present or have any knowledge of a terrorist plot may be charged with
acts of terrorism. The natural human tendency to engage in guilt by
association is one of the causes of miscarriages of justice, and this
tendency may be particularly compelling in a context where terrorists act
in cells and share certain political or religious beliefs. At a symbolic
level, the USA Patriot Act recognized that "the concept of individual
responsibility for wrongdoing is sacrosanct in American society, and
applies equally to all religious, racial, and ethnic groups.' 92 This is an
important and admirable statement about a bedrock principle of criminal
liability. 93 Nevertheless, the mere fact that this concept had to be
reaffirmed in the law in the wake of 9/11 is an implicit recognition of the
challenges that religious or ethnic differences and cell-based terrorism
present for traditional understandings of individual responsibility.
New criminal anti-terrorism laws in many parts of the world have
90. LouIs BLOM-COOPER, THE BIRMINGHAM SIX AND OTHER CASES: VICTIMS OF
CIRCUMSTANCE 9 (1997).
91. Note that most jurisdictions no longer require special warnings that before
accepting circumstantial evidence, juries must conclude that the evidence is inconsistent
with any other rational inference. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954);
McGreevy v. D.P.P., 1 All E.R. 503 (H.L. 1973); R. v. Cooper, [1978] S.C.R. 860.
92. USA Patriot Act, § 102(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 276 (2001).
93. For a discussion of how collective fault is anathema to principles of criminal
responsibility, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE
AGE OF TERRORISM (2002).
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broadened the grounds for conviction of crimes of terrorism beyond
those grounds normally provided by laws relating to accomplice and
inchoate liability. The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act, 200094 includes
broadly defined offences, such as membership in a terrorist organization
(section 11), use and possession of property and funds for terrorism
(section 16), or possession of anything for terrorist purposes (section
57). These offences are even broader than the forms of accomplice and
conspiracy liability used in the Irish cases. They increase the likelihood
that those who associate with terrorist suspects will also be charged with
a terrorist offence or threatened with such a charge. In Canada, the AntiTerrorism Act provides a variety of new, broadly defined crimes directed
at various forms of financing terrorism and terrorist groups, participating
in the activities of a terrorist group, facilitating a terrorist activity,
providing instructions about terrorist activity or activities that benefit
terrorist groups, and harboring or concealing terrorists.95 In the United
States, concerns have been raised about the breadth and the vagueness of
the frequently-employed charge of providing material support for
terrorists.

96

New anti-terrorism laws may encourage the police to

classify innocent associates of terrorists as terrorists.
The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act, 2000, also requires lower
fault levels and lower burdens of proof than are normally required under
the criminal law. For example, section 16(2)(b) of the act makes it an
offence for a person to possess money or property if "he knows or has
reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of
terrorism.

'97

The American crime of harboring or concealing terrorists,

as amended by the USA Patriot Act, similarly has an objective level of
fault, as it applies to "whoever harbors or conceals any person who he
knows, or has reasonable grounds to believe, has committed or is about
to commit ' ' 98 various offences involving terrorism.

In Canada, a new

offence of knowingly facilitating a terrorist activity has a reduced fault
level because it is not necessary to know "that a particular terrorist
activity is facilitated" or that "any particular terrorist activity was
foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated." 99
At a formal level, it could be argued that the expansion of terrorism
offences may actually reduce the possibility of convicting the factually
94. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.).
95. Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., c. C-34, pt. 11.1 (1985) (Can.). See generally
Kent Roach, Canada'sNew Anti-Terrorism Law, 2002 SINGAPORE J. OF LEGAL STUD. 122

(2002).
96.
Project
97.
98.
99.

USA Patriot Act, § 805 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339A); Humanitarian Law
v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
Terrorism Act, 2000, § 16(2)(b).
USA Patriot Act, § 803 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339).
Criminal Code of Canada, § 83.19.
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innocent. In other words, these offences authorize punishing those who
did not intend to assist terrorists, but who should have known they were
assisting terrorists. In the last part of this paper, we will suggest that
miscarriages of justice can profitably be understood apart from concerns
about the substantive justice of the laws being applied. Nevertheless,
broadly defined terrorism offences may make it more likely that
unwitting associates of terrorists who may not even be guilty under the
expanded crimes of terrorism will be wrongly detained, charged, and
convicted of crimes of terrorism.
The United Kingdom's Terrorism Act, 2000, also increases the risk
of convicting the innocent by altering the normal burden of proof that is
placed on the prosecution. For example, section 77(2) provides that for a
number of offences involving possession of explosives and firearms, "the
court may assume that the accused possessed (and, if relevant, knowingly
possessed) the article unless he proves that he did not know of its
presence on the premises or that he had no control over it."' 00 Requiring
the accused to disprove guilt obviously increases the risk of convicting
the guilty as it allows a conviction despite a reasonable doubt. The
dangers of the reverse burdens found throughout the Terrorism Act,
2000, are, however, lessened by another provision that reduces most of
the reverse burdens from persuasive burdens that require the accused to
establish an exonerating fact on a balance of probabilities to an evidential
burden that only requires "the person adduces evidence which is
sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter[,]" in which case the
prosecution is required to assume its normal burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 ' This provision was only added in light of
concerns that courts might find that a persuasive burden on the accused
would violate the right to a fair trial, which is protected under the
European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act,
1998. Although evidential burdens do mitigate some of the dangers of
persuasive burdens, they still require an active defense that adduces
evidence to displace a mandatory presumption that will otherwise apply.
To the extent that anti-terrorism laws depart from the standards of the
regular criminal law that are designed to protect the innocent, "it must
be recognised that in terrorist cases greater risks
of injustice are accepted
10 2
cases."'
criminal
of
course
than in the ordinary

100. Terrorism Act, 2000, § 77(2).
101. Id. § 118(2).
102. Sir John May Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Convictions Arising out of the Bomb Attacks in Guildford and Woolwich in 1974 Final
Report (1993-94 H.C. 449) at 21.8.
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Executive Listing of Terroristsand Terrorist Groups

Another feature of modem anti-terrorism law that increases the risk
of wrongful convictions is the reliance that is placed in international and
domestic law on lists of terrorists and terrorist groups. Under Canada's
Anti-Terrorism Act, for example, executive designation of a group as a
terrorist group is purported to constitute definitive proof for the purpose
of a criminal trial that the listed entity is a terrorist group. This could
effectively substitute an executive decision that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a group or even an individual has knowingly
carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist
activity, or is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction or in
association with such a group, for proof beyond a reasonable doubt at
criminal trials. °3 In addition, many jurisdictions incorporate lists of
individual terrorists compiled by the United Nations into regulations
relating to the financing of terrorism. Canadian law, to its credit,
recognizes the possibility of error by providing for a procedure by which
a person who has been mistakenly identified as part of a listed terrorist
group to obtain a prompt ruling from the executive. 104 At the same time,
this procedure involves only executive review and is designed only to
correct cases of mistaken identity, and not to examine the merits of the
decision to list a person or a group as a terrorist. In Canada, at least one
person has found himself wrongly listed as a terrorist, a mistake that took
months to correct.10 5 Although the listing itself does not constitute a
wrongful criminal conviction, it does result in a harmful stigma because
the lists are public and distributed to financial institutions. Informed
persons will not have financial dealings with a listed terrorist for fear of
being subject to criminal prosecutions for financing or assisting a
terrorist. Even if the listed person is never charged criminally, they may
still be treated and punished as if they were a terrorist.
J. Guilty Pleas
It cannot be assumed that all wrongful convictions in terrorism
cases will result from trials. In the Irish cases, the accused insisted on
their innocence and faced trials in which they were wrongfully
103. Criminal Code of Canada §§ 83.01(1), 83.05 (defining a "terrorist group" as a
"listed entity" and providing grounds for the executive to list terrorist groups,
respectively). For criticism of these laws, see David Paciocco, Constitutional Casualties
of September 11: Limiting the Legacy of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 185
(2002).
104. Criminal Code of Canada, § 83.07.
105. E.Alexandra Dosman, For the Record: Designating "Listed Entities" for the
Purposesof Terrorist FinancingOffences at CanadianLaw, 62 U. T. FAC. L. REV. 1, 1519(2004).
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convicted. In the current terrorism context, however, even those who
insist on their innocence may find it in their best interests to plea guilty
to a terrorism offence. One factor in the United States may be a concern
that a person who insists on a trial might be taken outside of the criminal
justice system by executive designation as an enemy combatant. Thus it
is not clear that those who plead guilty to terrorism criminal charges in
Portland, Oregon or Buffalo, New York may not have been concerned
about possible executive designation as an enemy combatant. 0 6 It is also
possible that non-citizens might plea guilty to criminal charges in order
to escape potentially harsher treatment under immigration law. Indeed,
this is a real prospect in Canada given that the Supreme Court has
refused to rule out the possibility that it may in some circumstances be
constitutional to deport a terrorist suspect even in cases where there is a
real risk that the person will be tortured upon his return to his country of
origin. 0 7 Prosecutors may also have incentives to offer favorable
sentences in return for guilty pleas so as to avoid having to disclose
sensitive intelligence either to the accused or the public. People who are
scared or have trouble communicating in the language used by courts
may also plea guilty to crimes that they did not commit.
K. Conclusion
There are many factors that contribute to miscarriages of justice.
Case studies and commissions of inquiry have generally established that
wrongful convictions are over-determined-that is, they are the result of
multiple and interrelated causes. We return to concern about the role of
tunnel vision in this context. In a sense, tunnel vision is the glue that
brings together a number of failings in the system-police negligence
and misconduct, prosecutorial overzealousness, skewed expert testimony
and the failure to discover or disclose exculpatory evidence. The
incidence of tunnel vision is arguably higher in the terrorism context. As
Clive Walker has said in the context of the Irish cases:
Amongst the reasons behind this tendency to lapse from acceptable
standards are, first, that terrorist action creates, and is designed to
create, extraordinary tension, fear and panic. These reactions are to
be induced in the forces of authority, such as the police, just as much
as in sectors of the public ....

Secondly, official reaction to terrorism

106. Michael J. Kelly, Executive Excess v. Judicial Process: American Judicial
Responses to the Government's War On Terror, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 787, 799-

803 (2003).
107. Suresh v. Canada [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3, para 78. For criticism of this deportation to
torture exception and arguments that it constitutes a derogation from rights under
domestic and international law see K. Roach, Domestic, International and Remedial

Dialogues About Rights: The CanadianExperience, 40 T.I.L.J. (forthcoming) (2005).
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often involves a conscious departure from the normal due process
ideology of the criminal justice system and tendency towards the
holding of grand "State trials". . . . There is also the "presentational"
aspect-the desire to be seen to be taking effective action against
terrorists. Even if the official action is in reality worthless, it can still
relieve public frustrations and fears ....
These wider society
considerations may also explain why miscarriages seem so hard to
remedy. The problem is not simply stubbornness, but an acquittal
10 8
becomes costly to the State in terms of its legitimacy and prestige.
When the criminal justice system is conscripted in the service of the war
on terrorism, one can easily see how departures from proper and
accepted professional duties and responsibilities can occur. Police,
prosecutors, scientists, civilian witness, and even judges and juries are at
risk of becoming involved in this goal-to catch the terrorist and restore
public order and confidence. The ominous note to Professor Walker's
caution is that a miscarriage of justice may be seen to have utility in
quelling public fears and frustrations through the conviction of someone
for the acts of violence against the state. A conviction of anyone-even
an innocent person-might for a time at least serve what Professor
Ackerman has called the reassurance function that is often thought
necessary after a horrible act of terrorism.10 9
Because wrongful
convictions are so impervious to authentic review, the revelation that the
prosecution was misguided may not be revealed for years, if ever. If it is
revealed, however, the conviction of the innocent will be seen by some
as legitimating some of the grievances of terrorists and it will be a stain
on any democracy's fight against terrorism.
Il1.

New Dimensions in the War Against Terror and New Dimensions
of Miscarriages of Justice

In the last section, we examined the risks of wrongful convictions in
terrorism cases arising from prosecutions of suspected IRA terrorists in
the 1970s and under new anti-terrorism laws enacted in many countries
after the September 11 terrorist attacks. To be sure, the risk of wrongful
convictions under these new anti-terrorism laws remains significant.
Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that attempts to prosecute
suspected terrorists after September 11 have been hampered in part
because of due process norms associated with the regular criminal
process. Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called twentieth hijacker, has been
charged with a variety of existing criminal conspiracy offences. The
government has repeatedly refused Moussaoui access to Ramzi bin al108.
109.

See Walker, supra note 39, at pp. 4 8-4 9 .
See Ackerman, supra note 23.
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Shibh who is in American custody and is believed to have played a key
role in the attacks. The trial judge eventually ruled that the death penalty
should not be applied and the matter is now the subject of appellate
litigation. An appeal court has affirmed Moussaoui's right to have
access to witnesses who can provide material evidence essential to his
defense, but has also held that the government has acted in good faith
and overturned the sanction of taking the death penalty off the table."
The experience in Germany with prosecutions under the criminal
law illustrates in even more dramatic form some of the difficulties of
criminal prosecutions in the terrorism context. One criminal conviction
arising from September 11 was the conviction of Mounir Motassedeq in
a Hamburg court of over 3,000 counts of accessory to murder. This
conviction, including the accused's fifteen year sentence, was reversed
on appeal. Although noting that the accused "is certainly far removed
from being clear of suspicion," the appeal court stressed that the accused
should have had access to evidence of a key witness, Ramzi bin al-Shibh.
The German Court reasoned that "a conflict between the security
interests of the executive and the rights to defense of the accused cannot
be resolved to the disadvantage of the accused." The Court defended the
legality model of the criminal law over the war metaphor by stating that
"we cannot abandon the rule of law. That would be the beginning of a
fatal development and ultimately a victory for the terrorists. . . . The
fight against terrorism cannot be a wild, unjust war.""' This appeal

court ruling followed on the heels of an acquittal of another alleged
member of the Hamburg al Qaeda cell a few weeks earlier, with both
courts emphasizing the importance of providing the accused access to
relevant evidence." 2 A retrial is pending in the Motassedeq case, but
again the United States has refused to make witnesses held in American
custody available and attempts are being made to deport the accused
should the prosecution again falter. 1 3 In these cases, the courts to their
credit seem to have learned some lessons from the wrongful convictions
in the Irish cases, particularly with respect to the need for full disclosure
to the accused.
Although there have been criminal prosecutions in the wake of
September 11 in many countries, there has also been increased interest in
110. United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 312-15 (4th Cir. 2004).
111. Jeff Sallot, Guilty verdict overturned in al-Qaeda suspect's case GLOBE AND
MAIL (Toronto), March 5, 2004, at A14; Desmond Butler German Judges ordera Retrial
for 9/11 FigureN.Y. TIMES, March 5, 2004, at Al.
112. Luke Harding, German Court Clears Student of Plotting with 9/11 Terrorists:

Verdict Casts Doubt on Conviction of Second Suspect and is Seen as Blow to U.S. and
German Investigators, THE GUARDIAN Feb. 6, 2004, at 21.
113. Craig Whitlock, 9/11 Cases Proving Difficult for Germany: Suspects May be
Sent Elsewherefor Trial, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at Al.
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alternatives to the criminal law, and especially alternatives that place less
of a burden of proof on the state and that are more amenable to
secrecy." 4 The most frequently used alternatives have been immigration
and military proceedings as a means to detain those suspected of terrorist
acts.
It can be argued that it is inappropriate to examine preventive
detention under immigration and military laws through the lens of
criminal law concerns about wrongful convictions and miscarriages of
justice. After all, detention under either immigration and military law is
not formally thought of as punishment and it should be temporary
pending deportation or the end of hostilities. Although it is important to
take note of these differences of form between criminal law and its less
restrained alternatives, issues of form should not eclipse those of
substance.
The substantive issues at stake implicate both the individual and the
government. From the individual's perspective, prison is prison. The
emphasis from the individual's perspective is on the effects of state
actions and not their purposes. Detention of terrorist suspects under
immigration or military law is not nearly as temporary as it may be in
non-terrorism cases. In the United Kingdom, indefinite detention has
been authorized with respect to terrorist suspects who cannot be deported
because of concerns that they will be tortured. The House of Lords has
recently rejected the government's defense of these measures as only a
"three wall prison" that can be avoided by voluntary acceptance of
deportation. It took a substantive approach that focused on the liberty
interests of the detainee with Lord Nicholls stating that "indefinite
imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in any country which
observes the rule of law. It deprives the detained person of the protection
a criminal trial is intended to afford. Wholly exceptional
circumstances
' 15
must exist before this extreme step can be justified." "
The argument that detention under military law is a temporary
measure designed to ensure that combatants do not return to the
battlefield is strained given the continued detention of combatants long
after the Taliban government in Afghanistan has been defeated and a
114.

K. Roach, Terrorism and the Criminal Law in V. RAMRAJ, M. HOR AND K.
ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY (forthcoming). In the United
Kingdom, for example, while 664 people have been arrested under the Terrorism Act,
2000 between September 11, 2001 and September 30, 2004, only seventeen individuals
have been convicted under the act. 118 people have been charged under the act and 135
were charged under other legislation. 315 people have been released without charge and
55 have been transferred to immigration officials. See Home Office Terrorism Act Arrest
and
Charge
Statistics
available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs3/
tatcarreststats.html.
ROACH, GLOBAL

115.

A. v. Secretary of State [2004] UKHL 56 at para 74.
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new government elected. Moreover, the logic of preventive detention is
strained to the breaking point when it is suggested that suspected
terrorists can be detained for as long as a seemingly never-ending war
against terrorism lasts.
The indefinite detention of people at
Guantanamo Bay is much more draconian than even temporary measures
enacted by countries such as Israel and the United
Kingdom which, like
16
terrorism.'
severe
faced
have
States,
United
the
It is also important to focus on substance rather than form when
evaluating the government's response to terrorism. In the present war
against international terrorism, many governments can choose between
criminal prosecutions or immigration or military proceedings as a means
to deal with terrorist suspects. Selecting less restrained, less demanding
and less public alternatives to criminal prosecutions will often be in their
tactical advantage. David Cole has argued that the United States has
chosen immigration law over criminal prosecutions for a variety of
reasons including the expansive nature of immigration law which can
authorize detention for a wide range of conduct including that of not
informing the government of a change of address and because the
procedures of immigration law are not as public or as protective of the
detainee as those of the criminal law. "Had it used criminal charges as a
basis for arrest and detention, the government would have had to provide
suspects with prompt access to independent federal courts and the
assistance of counsel. . . . Eighty percent of immigration detainees are
unrepresented. Under criminal law, the government must provide a
public trial; yet every special interest immigration detainee was tried in
secret."' 1 7 To this list, we would add that by choosing to avoid criminal
law, the government has so far avoided the danger of being seen to have
participated in the punishment of the innocent. Given the political and
moral weight of claims about factual innocence and wrongful
convictions, this is a non-trivial tactical advantage for the government.
Moreover, as we will suggest below, the diminished procedural hurdles
that the government faces outside of the criminal context may
significantly increase the danger that terrorist suspects who are in fact
innocent of terrorism will be subject to long-term detention under
immigration or military law.
A.

Immigration Proceedings

Immigration law has been used frequently since September 11 as
anti-terrorism law. In the United States, the immediate law enforcement
116. Stephen Schulhofer, Checks and Balances in Wartime: American, British and
Israeli Experiences, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1906, 1955 (August 2004).
117.

COLE, supra note 6, at 34-35.
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reaction to 9/11 was not the laying of criminal charges but a round-up of
terrorist suspects under immigration law. As Philip Heymann has
commented much of this use of immigration law has a pretextual quality:
"There are about 20 million aliens in the United States at any given time,
a high percentage of whom are at least technically in violation of one or
another visa regulation. But that fact is now being used as a device for
holding suspects-most only weakly linked to terrorism-for purposes
of interrogation or incapacitation."1' 18
The pre-textual use of
immigration law provides a real challenge to those concerned about
miscarriages of justice because it means that it may not be possible for a
detainee who is not a terrorist suspect to claim factual innocence under
all immigration law.
1. Ministerial Security Certificates under Canada's Immigration
and Refugee ProtectionAct
Immigration law routinely employs what in criminal law would be
seen as problematic status-based offences and standards of proof well
below the criminal law standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For
example, section 34 of Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act allows a non-citizen to be declared inadmissible on security grounds
for being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds
to believe either engages, has engaged or will engage in terrorism. 1 9 In
addition, section 33 of the Act provides that grounds of inadmissibility
such as membership in a terrorist organization, engaging in terrorism or
being a danger to the security of Canada exist if "there a reasonable
grounds to believe they have occurred, are occurring or may occur."
Membership in a terrorist organization can be proven on the basis of 2a0
bona fide belief in a serious possibility based on credible evidence.
This standard is less onerous for the government than even the civil
standard of proof on a balance of probabilities, let alone the criminal law
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Canadian immigration act has been criticized both in the United

118.

HEYMANN, supra note 5, at 92.
119. Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection Act S.C. 2001 c. 27 (IRPA)
§ 34(1)(f) provides that: "A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on
security grounds for ...being a member of an organization that there are reasonable
grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts ... [of] terrorism." The
Supreme Court of Canada has read down this provision to allow a refugee applicant "to
establish that his or her continued residence in Canada will not be detrimental to Canada,
notwithstanding proof that the person is associated with or a member of a terrorist
organization. This permits a refugee to establish that the alleged association with the
terrorist group was innocent." Suresh v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para 110.
120. Chiau v. Canada, [2001] 2 F.C. 207, 209 (C.A.).
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States 2 ' and Canada, 22 for being too lenient with respect to terrorist
suspects, but it has some very draconian provisions. For example, it
provides for investigative detention on the basis that "the Minister is
taking necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they are
inadmissible on grounds of security or for violating human or
international rights."'' 23 There is no limit on this period of detention, but
the reasons for the detention must be reviewed every thirty days. 24 In
contrast, preventive arrests under the criminal law amendments of
Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act require a reasonable and probable grounds
that a terrorist activity will be carried, reasonable suspicion in relation to
the individual and are limited to no more than seventy-two hours of
25
detention.
Another procedure available under Canadian immigration law but
not Canadian criminal law is the use of security certificates to detain and
remove non-citizens. Security certificates were introduced in Canadian
immigration law in the early 1990s and about twenty-seven security
certificates have been signed by the Ministers of Immigration and the
Solicitor General since that time. Those subject to a security certificate
may be subject to indefinite detention until the certificate has been
reviewed by the judge and if upheld, they have been removed
from
26
Canada on the basis that they are a danger to national security.
The security certificate is subject to judicial review in the Federal
Court to determine its reasonableness, but this judicial review pre-empts
other proceedings, including applications for refugee status and appeals.
The procedure for reviewing security certificates is extraordinary
because it involves the judge being required to hear the evidence in the
absence of the person named in the certificate and their counsel if, in the
judge's opinion, the disclosure of information would be injurious to
national security or the safety of any person. Such information can be
used by the judge in determining the reasonableness of the certificate, but
it cannot even be included in a summary of other evidence that can be
121. Library of Congress Research Division, Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime
and Terrorism 147, 152-53 (October 2003) availableat http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/
Nats%5FHospitable.pdf. Note that the methodology and orientation of the report has
been criticized by many in Canada. See, US terror study 'crude' 'inexpert,' TORONTO
STAR, Feb. 17, 2004, at A04. On the false claims that some of the 9/11 hijackers entered
the United States from Canada, see KENT ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR
CANADA 5-6 (2003).
122. Stewart Bell, Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around
the World 55 (2004).
123. IRPA § 58(1)(c).
124. IRPA § 57(2).
125. Criminal Code of Canada § 83.3.
126. See IRPA §§ 82-84. These sections contain the complex detention provisions,
which also make it easier to detain a foreign national as opposed to a permanent resident.
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provided to the person named. 27 The Supreme Court of Canada upheld
a somewhat similar procedure in an earlier act, but stressed the
importance of providing at least a summary of the evidence to the person
28
named in the certificate.1
Somewhat similar procedures are available under Canadian criminal
law with respect to preserving the confidentiality of information obtained
in confidence from a foreign entity or for protecting national defense or
national security. An important exception under the criminal law,
however, is that the criminal trial judge has the right, with regards to
non-disclosure of national security information to the accused, to make
any order, including a stay of the entire criminal proceedings, that he or
she "considers appropriate in the circumstances to protect the right of the
accused to a fair trial."' 2 9 Such orders are not contemplated under
Canadian immigration law. Indeed if the judge upholds the security
certificate as reasonable, the person named is subject to removal without
appeal and30 without being eligible to make a claim for refugee
protection.
The incursions that are made on standards of due process or
adjudicative fairness in the name of keeping information affecting
national security confidential but usable in security certificate
proceedings is well demonstrated by a 2002 speech given by an
experienced judge of the Federal Court of Canada, a specialized court in
Canada that has jurisdiction over many security matters. He commented
that:
We do not like this process of having to sit alone hearing only one
party and looking at the materials produced by only one party and
having to try to figure out for ourselves what is wrong with the case
that is being presented before us and having to try for ourselves to see
how that 3witnesses that appear before us ought to be crossexamined. ' '
127. See IRPA § 78(e). Section 78(e) of IRPA provides that at the government's
request "the judge shall hear all or part of the information or evidence in the absence of
the permanent resident or the foreign national named in the certificate and their counsel
if, in the opinion of the judge, its disclosure would be injurious to national security or to
the safety of ant person." See IRPA § 78(h). Section 78(h) provides that "the judge shall
provide the permanent resident or the foreign national with a summary of the information
or evidence that enables them to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise
to the certificate, but that does not include anything that in the opinion of the judge would
be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person if disclosed."
128. Chiarelli v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R, 711, 727-28.
129. Canada Evidence Act, supra note 80 at § 38.14(1).
130. IRPA§81(c).
131. James Hugessen, Watching the Watchers: Democratic Oversight in David
Daubney et al., Terrorism, Law & Democracy: How is Canada Changing following
September 11?: Papers Presented at a Conference Organized by the CanadianInstitute
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The judge ended his speech with an extraordinary confession-"I
sometimes feel a little bit like a fig leaf."'132 He also suggested a more
proportionate alternative to the present system, one based on the British
system of allowing lawyers with security clearances to have access to
confidential information and play the role of the adversary in the national
security context. 133 Unfortunately, this suggestion has yet to be taken up.
In a recent and strikingly executive-minded decision, the Federal
Court of Appeal upheld the security certificate process as consistent with
the guarantee of fundamental justice under the Canadian Charter and
indicated that the question of whether to reform the system to allow
adversarial challenge by way of a special advocate was a matter for the
legislature. 134 The dangers of miscarriages of justice were, however,
present even in the case in which the security certificate was held to be
consistent with constitutional standards. The most damning evidence
against the detainee that was made publicly available was that
photographs of him had been identified by two terrorists in American
custody, including Ahmed Ressam, who was apprehended with plans to
cause explosions at the Los Angeles airport at the Millenium.135 No
information was, however, provided about the means of photoidentification. False eyewitness identification is a frequent cause of
miscarriages of justice. 136 Some steps like a sequential photo line-up
with at least 10 possible persons can help minimize the risk of false

for the Administration of Justice, Held in Montreal, Quebec, Mar. 25-26, 2002
(Montreal: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2002) at 384.
132. Id at. 386.
133. Under a previous Canadian law, a review of security certificates issued against
permanent residents was conducted by the independent review body for Canada's
security intelligence agency and security cleared counsel for that agency played an
adversarial role in challenging the security certificate. See Murray Rankin, The Security
Intelligence Review Committee: Reconciling National Security with ProceduralFairness,
3 CANADIAN J.OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 173 (1990). The British system

will be discussed below.
134. Charkaoui (Re), [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060. Decary and Letourneau JJ.A. stated "if
we were to accept the appellant's position that national security cannot justify any
derogations from the rules governing adversarial proceedings we would be reading into
the Constitution of Canada an abandonment by the community as a whole of its right to
survival in the name of a blind absolutism of the individual rights enshrined in the
Constitution." Id. at para 100. They also argued that normal standards of adjudicative
fairness did not apply because "the threat of terrorism or a threat to national security does
not represent or reflect a situation of normality, at least not in our country." Id. at para
84.
135. Id. at paras 17-18.

136.

STANLEY COHEN, THE WRONG MEN: AMERICA'S EPIDEMIC OF WRONGFUL DEATH

Row CONVICTIONS Part

II (2003);

BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD AND JIM DWYER,

ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED 41-77 (2001); MICHAEL RADELET, HUGO BEDAU AND CONSTANCE

PUTNAM, INSPITE OF INNOCENCE 7-9, 239-40, 248-49 (1992).
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identification, 137 but it is not known whether such steps were taken when
a detainee under a Canadian security certificate was identified by
detained terrorists as a person who attended terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan.
One of the striking features of reliance on the immigration law to
detain and deport suspected terrorists is how little attention is given to
the risk of harming the innocent. As suggested above, immigration
proceedings often fail to result in a full adversarial challenge to the
government's case and the government does not have to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Security concerns about the information
may preclude disclosure to detainees or even attendance by the detainees
and their lawyers at the hearings. The information that is used in
immigration proceedings may come from foreign sources of unknown
reliability. Translation issues and lack of knowledge of the political
situation of the country in which the detainee is alleged to have
participated in terrorism or have been a member of a terrorist
organization may also increase the risk of error.
The reasons why the risk of error in immigration proceedings has
not generated the same type of concern generated by wrongful
convictions under the criminal law are speculative. One factor may be a
lack of knowledge about immigration law in general. Another factor
may unfortunately be prejudice or a lack of concern about non-citizens.
Yet another factor may be a perception that the consequences of removal
under immigration law are not as great as the risk of imprisonment and
perhaps execution under the criminal law.
At the same time,
immigration proceedings, even under Canada's allegedly lenient
immigration law, can involve prolonged periods of detention before
deportation and regrettably in Canada could possibly include deportation
of a terrorist suspect to face torture. 138 As will be seen below, the use of
immigration law to detain terrorists suspects in the United Kingdom has
been intensely controversial because of the government's attempt to
provide for indefinite detention through an explicit derogation from fair
trial rights. In contrast, long periods of detention under immigration
regimes in Canada and the United
States seem to have attracted less
39
public attention and criticism. 1

137. Province of Manitoba Justice, The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow: The
Investigation, Prosecution and Consideration of Entitlement to Compensation (2001)
availableat http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/sophonow/recommendations/english.html.
138. Suresh, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para 78.
139. But see, COLE, supra note 6, and Audrey Macklin, Borderline Security in
PATRICK MACKLEM, RONALD J. DANIELS, AND KENT ROACH, THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM:

ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL (2001).
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2.
Indefinite Detention under the United Kingdom's Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001
The use of immigration law to detain and deport suspected terrorists
is striking given the alternative that is available under most new antiterrorism criminal laws of charging these people with a broad range of
criminal offences relating to terrorism. Most new criminal anti-terrorism
offences define support for terrorism in a broad fashion and apply extraterritorially. In the United Kingdom the reliance on immigration law in
the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act was especially striking
given the broad crimes, including crimes of membership in a terrorist
group, that are available under the Terrorism Act, 2000.
Section 21 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act allows the
Secretary of State to issue a certificate with respect to a non-citizen if he
or she "reasonably believes that the person's presence in the United
Kingdom is a risk to national security, and suspects that the person is a
terrorist." A terrorist is defined broadly as a person who "is or has been
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
international terrorism" or "is a member of or belongs to an international
terrorist group" or "has links with an international terrorist group" with
140
links being further defined as supporting or assisting the group.
Section 23 of the Act provides for continued detention of the person so
certified even though "his departure from the United Kingdom is
prevented (whether temporarily or indefinitely)" by legal or practical
concerns. In order to effect this form of indefinite detention, the British
government derogated from 14 fair
trial rights under the European
1
Convention on Human Rights.
Appeals and reviews relating to the ministerial certification of
terrorists and their detention are heard by a special tribunal, the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), composed of a judge and two
42
other persons with expertise in immigration and security respectively.
Unlike under the Canadian security certificate process examined above,
the British SIAC procedure allows for the appointment of a security
cleared special advocate who can challenge those parts of the
government's case that cannot for reasons of national security be
disclosed to the detainee.1 43 The system is not perfect because the
special advocate cannot take instructions from the detainee or discuss
such matters with the detainee, but it is superior to the Canadian system
because it allows for adversarial challenge of the government's case and
140.

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).

141.
142.
143.

Human Rights Act (Designated Derogation Order), 1998, SI 2001/3644 (Eng.).
Special Immigration Appeals Act 1997, c. 68 (Eng.).
Id. at § 5.
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does not rely on a combination of the judicial body vetting the case and
the government's lawyers presenting the case fairly.
The indeterminate detention provisions under Part IV of the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act have been intensely controversial in
large part because the British government decided to make an explicit
derogation from fair trial rights. The American equivalent to an explicit
derogation would be a law suspending habeas corpus. A respected
review committee, the Newton Committee, recommended that as "a
matter of urgency" the immigration law powers of indefinite detention
contained in Part IV of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001
be replaced and steps taken to rely more on criminal prosecutions against
non-citizens and citizens alike. 144 The United Kingdom government
rejected this suggestion concluding that the Newton Committee did "not
offer a solution to the need to protect sensitive information, whilst
enabling the defendant to know the full case that has been put against
him."1 45 The government also defended the use of indeterminate
detention against only non-citizens by arguing that "it is defensible to
distinguish between foreign nationals and our own citizens" because of
"their different rights and responsibility" and because "such draconian
powers would be difficult to justify" with respect to British citizens and
because "experience has demonstrated the dangers of such an approach
and the damage it can cause to community cohesion and thus to support
from all parts of the public that is so essential to countering the terrorist
threat., 146 In other words, the government argued that it did not want to
disclose sensitive information in criminal proceedings and that it was
reluctant to extend draconian powers of internment to its own citizens.
Both of these arguments were dealt a crushing blow by the House of
Lords in its landmark decision in A (FC) v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department. In an 8:1 ruling the House of Lords held that
indeterminate detention of non-citizen terrorist suspects was both
disproportionate to the government's legitimate objective in fighting
terrorism and discriminatory against non-citizens. Most of the judgments
focused on these important issues. A few of the Law Lords, however,
adverted to the risks that the innocent could be caught within the broad
grounds provided in immigration law for detention of suspected
144. Lord Newton chair, Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 Review Report,
Dec. 18, 2003, at para 203-205. The Newton Committee suggested that some reforms to
the criminal law such as the use of a security cleared judge to assemble the case, greater
incentives for plea bargains and "a more structured disclosure process that is better
designed to allow the reconciliation of the needs of national security with the rights of the
accused to a fair trial." Id. at para 241.
145. Home Secretary, Counter-terrorismPowers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in
an Open Society, Feb. 2004, Part II, at para 37.
146. id. at para 36.
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terrorists. Lord Hoffmann for example stated that:
[T]he suspect is not entitled to be told the grounds upon which he has
been suspected. So he may not find it easy to explain that the
suspicion is groundless. In any case, suspicion of being a supporter is
one thing and proof of wrongdoing is another. Someone who has
never committed any offence and has no intention of doing anything
wrong may be reasonably suspected of being
a supporter on the basis
47
of some heated remarks heard in a pub.'
Baroness Hale added that the administrative tribunal, SIAC, "does not
decide whether the detainee actually is an international terrorist as
defined in the Act, merely whether the Home Secretary reasonably
suspects that he is.' 48 Immigration law uses much lower standards of
proof and broader standards of liability than even enhanced criminal laws
against terrorism.
Eight of the nine judges of Britain's highest courts found that the
immigration indeterminate detention scheme violated the equality rights
of non-citizens by exposing them to harsher powers than used against
terrorist suspects who are British citizens. They emphatically rejected
the government's argument that non-citizens were in unique positions
because they as opposed to citizens were subject to deportation. Lord
Bingham concluded that "what cannot be justified here is the decision to
detain one group of suspected international terrorists, defined by
nationality or immigration status, and not another."'149 This finding of
147. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, 2 W.L.R.
87.
148. Id. at para 223.
149. Id. at para 68. He noted the United States Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), against indefinite detention of aliens while noting that "the
court did not have to consider the position of aliens judge to present a terrorist risk but
might well have sanctioned indefinite detention in such circumstances given the
heightened deference shown by US courts to the judgments of the political branches with
respect to national security." He then, however, concluded that "US authority does not
provide evidence of general international practice" and would constitute discrimination
on the basis of national origin. Id. at para 69. Lord Hope also stressed equality concerns
in concluding that "the distinction which the government seeks to draw between these
two groups-British nationals and foreign nationals-raises an issue of
discrimination .... It proceeds on the misconception that it is a sufficient answer to the
question whether the derogation is strictly required that the two groups have different
rights in the immigration context. So they do. But the derogation is from the right to
liberty. The right to liberty is the same for each group." Id. at para 132. Lord Scott
explained his finding of discrimination in the following terms: "If those who are
suspected terrorists include some non-Muslims as well as Muslims, it would, in my
opinion, be irrational and discriminatory to restrict the application of the measures to
Muslims even though the bulk of those suspects are likely to profess as Muslims. Some
might well not be professed Muslims. Similarly it would be irrational and discriminatory
to restrict the application of the measures to men although the bulk of those suspected are
likely to be male. Some might well be women. Similarly, in my opinion, it is irrational
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discrimination is important in light of Ronald Dworkin's argument that
even if there is no right to the most accurate procedure possible, that
there is no right 50
to impose the risk of inaccuracies disproportionately on
discrete groups.1
The United Kingdom government has accepted this decision and
allowed the law authorizing indeterminate detention of non-citizen
terrorist suspects who cannot be deported to lapse even though the House
of Lords does not have the power to strike the law down. In its place,
Parliament enacted the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005
that allows control orders, including the power of house arrest, to be
imposed on terrorist suspects.15 1 Although such powers could be subject
to abuse especially if imposed only on the basis of suspicions and
without judicial involvement, they are more proportionate in not
imposing indefinite detention and in having both citizens and noncitizens equally exposed to the risk of error. The new law will also expire
in one year unless it is renewed. Experience may prove that those
previously detained under immigration laws can live safely in the
community.
Since September 11, many Western states have proceeded against
suspected international terrorists under immigration laws which allow
preventive and indefinite detention and closed hearings based on
evidence not disclosed to the non-citizen rather than attempt to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial. The use of
immigration law raises questions to be addressed in the last part of this
paper about the adequacy of restricting concerns about miscarriages of
justice to the criminal context. In other words, it may be wrong to
assume that the innocent are not being detained and punished in a postSeptember 11 world simply because there have been relatively few
criminal prosecutions and no documented cases of wrongful convictions
that repeat the experience in the Irish cases. Times change, and the
innocent today may be more likely to be detained under immigration
laws that provide far fewer restraints on the state and far fewer
protections against the detention of the innocent than the criminal law.
This does not, however, mean that there should not be concerns about
injustice in immigration detention. Prison is prison and innocence is
innocence even if the mechanism of imprisonment is immigration law.

and discriminatory to restrict the application of the measures who have no right of
residence in this country. Some suspected terrorists might well be home-grown." Id. at
para 158.
150. DWORKIN, supra note 4.
151. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005 c.2 (U.K.).
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Material Witness Warrants

Less restrained alternatives to criminal prosecutions are not limited
to immigration proceedings. In the United States, material witness
warrants have been used as part of investigations into terrorism.'
The
Second Circuit has upheld the use of material witness warrants in a case
where a person who was suspected of having knowledge of the
September 11 plot was detained for months in relation to a grand jury
investigation.
The Court emphasized the state interest in the
investigation and held that the lack of any time limit on detention under
federal rules for detention of material witnesses did not render the
procedure unconstitutional. 153 It stressed that those detained under
material witness warrants would have access to bail hearings and
indicated that a magistrate in the particular case had made a harmless
error when he denied bail on grounds of concerns about future danger, as
well as the 54ground of ensuring that the detainee would testify before the
grand jury.
From the government's perspective, one of the advantages of
material witness warrants is the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
Another advantage is the ability to interrogate and obtain information
from the detainee without laying a criminal charge but with the real
possibility of charging the detainee with a perjury offence if they are not
truthful with the grand jury. Michael Chertoff, then assistant attorney
general in charge of the Justice Department's criminal division, defended
material witness warrants as "an important investigative tool in the war
on terrorism.... Bear in mind that you get not only testimony-you get
fingerprints, you get hair samples-so there's all kinds of evidence you
can get from a witness." He also defended the procedure on the basis of
the role of the judge in the proceeding. "This is always supervised by a
federal judge. . . . It doesn't happen in the back room of a stationhouse

somewhere.... That's the bedrock point: The judge always supervises.
If the judge has a problem, then he can order the removal of the
witness."' 15 5 At the same time, however, the use of material witness
warrants can amount to a form of indefinite investigative detention. As
Philip Heymann has concluded, material witness warrants allow for the
detention of an "open-ended category of prospective witnesses before an
investigating

grand jury

...

an institution

largely

controlled by

152. See United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541, 1562 (D. Colo. 1996)
(providing pre-9/1 1 example).
153. United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 at 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2003).
154. Id.atn.15.
155. Steve Fainaru and Margot Williams, Material Witness Law Has Many In Limbo:
Nearly Half Held in War On Terror Haven't Testified, WASH. POST, Nov 24, 2002, at Al.
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prosecutors that has wide scope to investigate without serious judicial
review." He sees the new use of material witness warrants as part of a
significant change in the relations of individual and the state-a change
that "has been tolerable to Americans only because it is implicitly and
seemingly5 6 reliably limited to discrete groups to which most do not
belong.0

Perhaps the most well known case of detention of a terrorist suspect
under a material witness warrant is that of Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon
lawyer and convert to Islam, who was detained under a material witness
warrant from May 6, 2004 to May 20, 2004 before the FBI admitted that
its computer and its experts were mistaken when they concluded that
Mayfield's fingerprints matched those found on explosives used in
terrorist bombings in Madrid.157 It is not surprising that the best known
case involves a white lawyer and American citizen and not the many
non-citizens and others of Arab descent that have been detained under
material witness warrants.158 The Mayfield case also underlines the risk
of error in terrorism case and the extensive publicity and stigma that may
accompany the use of even a material witness warrant.
C. MilitaryDetention and Determinationof Enemy Combatant Status
Another less restrained alternative to the criminal law has been the
use of military force to apprehend and detain suspected terrorists as
prisoners of war or enemy combatants. Earlier on in the war against
Afghanistan, President Bush made a decision that detainees were not
entitled to the benefits of the Geneva Convention. Unlike in the first
Gulf War, people were detained as enemy combatants without the benefit
of hearings to determine the accuracy of the government's claims that
they were not prisoners of war. The initial lack of hearings into the
status of those captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan raised serious
risks that people who were not even combatants would be detained. It
should be recalled that people are captured and interrogated under
stressful circumstances of war and perhaps without the aid of accurate
translation. In the first Gulf War, over 1200 hearings were held to
determine the status of captives and in about two thirds of these
cases,
59
the detainees were found to be misplaced civilians or refugees.
The release of a significant number of detainees captured in
Afghanistan and elsewhere from Guantanamo underlines the risk of error
156.
157.
158.
witness
159.

supra note 5, at 92-93.
Parts of the case file are posted at www.orduscourts.gov/Mayfield/6MayO4.pdf.
Only seven of the forty-four identified in one study as subject to a material
warrant were American citizens. COLE, supra note 6, at 39.
Id. at 42, 245 n. 69 .
HEYMANN,
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in detaining a person as an enemy combatant. One of the persons
released from Guantanamo in October 2002 said he was 105 years old
and was described in a report as "babbling at times like a child."
Another released detainee described as a "wizened old man with a cane"
said he was ninety-years-old and had been detained in a raid on his
village in Afghanistan. On the basis of these and other cases, Michael
Ratner has argued:
Some might claim that these releases show that the Administration is
willing to release people from Guantanamo. However, the example
cuts the other way. Here were men who obviously should never have
been taken to Guantanamo and yet they were imprisoned. Here were
men who, had there been a hearing before some form of a tribunal,
would have been free long ago.... These stories of the innocent, of
some detainees not involved in any fighting, of detainees that were no
more than lowly foot soldiers, demonstrate the importance of a legal
process for 160determining the status of those imprisoned at
Guantanamo.

Ratner goes on to note that proposals for harsh treatment of detainees
such as the use of torture should be viewed in part through the lens of the
fallibility of the legal process. Invoking the extensive American
experience of death row exonerations, 161 he argues that "even with full
court processes necessary to prosecute an alleged murderer and the fact
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is necessary
for convictions,
' 162
common."
too
all
are
innocent
the
of
convictions
The lack of process concerning military detentions can produce
false positives that result in the detention of the innocent, but also false
negatives that can result in the release of the guilty. The Department of
Defence for example claims that twelve people released from
Guantanamo Bay have returned to terrorist or battlefield activities.
Although this is cited by Pentagon officials as evidence of the need for
caution with respect to further releases, it could also be interpreted as
affirming the value of full adversarial procedure in identifying both the
innocent and the guilty. One of the reasons why wrongful convictions
have commanded bi-partisan concern in the criminal justice field is
because each wrongful conviction allows the guilty to go free as well as
160. Michael Ratner, Moving Away from the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals,
Executive Detentionsand the Rule of Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 1513, 1520 (2003).
161. See, e.g., Illinois Report of the Governor's Commission on CapitalPunishment
(2002); James Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 19731995, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1839 (2000); Michael Radelet et al., Prisoners Released From
Death Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv.

907 (1996).
162. Ratner, supra note 160, at 1521.
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Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld

The legal landscape affecting the Guantanamo detentions changed
significantly in the summer of 2004. In Rasul v. Bush, 164 the United
States Supreme Court decided 6:3 that the habeas corpus jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts extended to those detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 65 the United States Supreme Court considered a
habeas corpus application from Yaser Hamdi who was captured in
Afghanistan. He was originally detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but
transferred to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia when officials learned of
his American citizenship. He was alleged by the government to have
been fighting with the Taliban since his arrival in Afghanistan in July or
August, 2001 while his father claimed he was in Afghanistan to do relief
work. The Court's decision was a divided one, but for our purposes, the
focus will be on Justice O'Connor's plurality judgment that was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer. She held
that the detention of the enemy combatants was authorized by Congress's
166
authorization of the use of military force in the war against terrorism.
Justice O'Connor also held that due process required that Hamdi "be
given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis" of his
detention "before a neutral decision-maker." In determining the precise
requirements of due process, Justice O'Connor rejected the District
Court's conclusion that reliance on hearsay contained in an affidavit
called the Mobbs declaration was not sufficient and that Hamdi should
have access to copies of his statements in custody and the names of his
interrogators. Indeed, Justice O'Connor appeared to criticize the District
Court for "agreeing with Hamdi" and concluding "that the appropriate
' 67
process would approach the process that accompanies a criminal trial."'
In this way, the O'Connor opinion makes it crystal clear that enemy
combatants, including those who are American citizens, are not entitled
to the same level of procedural protections as the criminal accused.
On the issue of what process was due, Justice O'Connor articulated
the following key propositions:
We ... hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
163. There are however some important differences as the subsequent return of
detainees released from Guantanamo to hostilities involves an error in predicting future
activity more than an error in determining historical guilt.
164.
165.

Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).

166.

Authorization For Use Of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224

(2001).

167.

Hamdi,124 S. Ct. at 2649.
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classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker....
Hearsay... may need to be accepted as the most reliable available
evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained a
rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided....
There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated
could be 16met
by an appropriately authorized and constituted military
8
tribunal.

This conception of due process and the application of the balancing test
contemplated in Mathews v. Eldridge169 was only agreed to by four of the
nine justices. Justice Souter, with the concurrence of Justice Ginsberg,
would not have reached this point because he found that Congress had
not authorized the detention and the detention was therefore forbidden by
existing law providing that American citizens can only be detained by an
Act of Congress.170 In order to give practical effect to the decision,
Justice Souter joined with the plurality to affirm that Hamdi should have
an opportunity to offer evidence that he was not an enemy combatant.
However, Justice Souter specifically cautioned that "I do not mean to
imply agreement that the Government could claim an evidentiary
presumption casting the burden of rebuttal on Hamdi or that an
opportunity to litigate before a military tribunal might obviate or truncate
1' 71
enquiry by a court on habeas."
Justice Scalia, with the concurrence of Justice Stevens, was more
dismissive of the plurality's approach, calling it "an unheard-of system in
which the citizen rather than the Government bears the burden of proof,
testimony is by hearsay rather than live witnesses, and the presiding
officer may well be a "neutral" military officer rather than judge and
jury.' 7 2 Justice Thomas dissented on the basis that the plurality had not
paid adequate attention to the Government's compelling interests in
times of war.
2.

Combatant Status Review Tribunals

A little over a week after the decisions in Rasul and Hamdi, an
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunals was issued by
168.

Id. at 2648-9, 2651.

169.

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
18 USC § 4001(a) (1971) (Non-Detention Act).
Hamdi,124 S. Ct. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and

170.
171.

concurring in judgment).
172. Id. at 2673-84.
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Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.
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[Vol. 109:4

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
73

As will be seen, this

The full text of the July 7, 2004 order at www.defenselink.mil/news/

Jul2004/d20040707/review/pdf provides:
This Order applies only to foreign nationals held as enemy combatants in the control
of the Department of Defense at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba ("detainees").
a. Enemy Combatant. For purposes of this Order, the term "enemy combatant"
shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a
belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed
forces. Each detainee subject to this Order has been determined to be an enemy
combatant through multiple levels of review by officers of the Department of
Defense.
b. Notice. Within ten days after the date of this Order, all detainees shall be
notified of the opportunity to contest designation as an enemy combatant in the
proceeding described herein, of the opportunity to consult with and be assisted
by a personal representative as described in paragraph (c), and of the right to
seek a writ of habeas corpus in the courts of the United States.
c. Personal Representative. Each detainee shall be assigned a military officer,
with the appropriate security clearance, as a personal representative for the
purpose of assisting the detainee in connection with the review process
described herein. The personal representative shall be afforded the opportunity
to review any reasonably available information in the possession of the
Department of Defense that may be relevant to a determination of the
detainee's designation as an enemy combatant, including any records,
determinations, or reports generated in connection with earlier determinations
or reviews, and to consult with the detainee concerning that designation and
any challenge thereto. The personal representative may share any information
with the detainee, except for classified information, and may participate in the
Tribunal proceedings as provided in paragraph (g)(4).
d. Tribunals. Within 30 days after the detainee's personal representative has
been afforded the opportunity to review the reasonably available information in
the possession of the Department of Defense and had an opportunity to consult
with the detainee, a Tribunal shall be convened to review the detainee's status
as an enemy combatant.
e. Composition of Tribunal. A Tribunal shall be composed of three neutral
commissioned officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, each of whom possesses the
appropriate security clearance and none of whom was involved in the
apprehension, detention, interrogation, or previous determination of status of
the detainee. One of the members shall be a judge advocate. The senior
member (in the grade of 0-5 and above) shall serve as President of the Tribunal.
Another non-voting officer, preferably a judge advocate, shall serve as the
Recorder and shall not be a member of the Tribunal.
f Convening Authority. The Convening Authority shall be designated by the
Secretary of the Navy. The Convening Authority shall appoint each Tribunal
and its members, and a personal representative for each detainee.
The
Secretary of the Navy, with the concurrence of the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, may issue instructions to implement this Order.
g. Procedures.
(1) The Recorder shall provide the detainee in advance of the proceedings
with notice of the unclassified factual basis for the detainee's designation
as an enemy combatant.
(2) Members of the Tribunal and the Recorder shall be sworn. The
Recorder shall be sworn first by the President of the Tribunal. The
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Recorder will then administer an oath, to faithfully and impartially
perform their duties, to all members of the Tribunal to include the
President.
(3) The record in each case shall consist of all the documentary evidence
presented to the Tribunal, the Recorder's summary of all witness
testimony, a written report of the Tribunal's decision, and a recording of
the proceedings (except proceedings involving deliberation and voting by
the members), which shall be preserved.
(4) The detainee shall be allowed to attend all proceedings, except for
proceedings involving deliberation and voting by the members or
testimony and other matters that would compromise national security if
held in the presence of the detainee.
The detainee's personal
representative shall be allowed to attend all proceedings, except for
proceedings involving deliberation and voting by the members of the
Tribunal.
(5) The detainee shall be provided with an interpreter, if necessary.
(6) The detainee shall be advised at the beginning of the hearing of the
nature of the proceedings and of the procedures accorded him in
connection with the hearing.
(7) The Tribunal, through its Recorder, shall have access to and consider
any reasonably available information generated in connection with the
initial determination to hold the detainee as an enemy combatant and in
any subsequent reviews of that determination, as well as any reasonably
available records, determinations, or reports generated in connection
therewith.
(8) The detainee shall be allowed to call witnesses if reasonably available,
and to question those witnesses called by the Tribunal. The Tribunal shall
determine the reasonable availability of witnesses. If such witnesses are
from within the U.S. Armed Forces, they shall not be considered
reasonably available if, as determined by their commanders, their presence
at a hearing would affect combat or support operations. In the case of
witnesses who are not reasonably available, written statements, preferably
sworn, may be submitted and considered as evidence.
(9) The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence such as would
apply in a court of law. Instead, the Tribunal shall be free to consider any
information it deems relevant and helpful to a resolution of the issue
before it. At the discretion of the Tribunal, for example, it may consider
hearsay evidence, taking into account the reliability of such evidence in
the circumstances. The Tribunal does not have the authority to declassify
or change the classification of any national security information it reviews.
(10) The detainee shall have a right to testify or otherwise address the
Tribunal in oral or written form, and to introduce relevant documentary
evidence.
(11) The detainee may not be compelled to testify before the Tribunal.
(12) Following the hearing of testimony and the review of documents and
other evidence, the Tribunal shall determine in closed session by majority
vote whether the detainee is properly detained as an enemy combatant.
Preponderance of evidence shall be the standard used in reaching this
determination, but there shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence.
(13) The President of the Tribunal shall, without regard to any other
provision of this Order, have authority and the duty to ensure that all
proceedings of or in relation to the Tribunal under this Order shall comply
with Executive Order 12958 regarding national security information.
The Record. The Recorder shall, to the maximum extent practicable,
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Order was inspired by Justice O'Connor's plurality decision. 174 As a
technical legal matter, this approach also seems to rely on Justice
Thomas' more extreme position on the limits of due process because, as
discussed above, both Justices Souter and Scalia, speaking in total for
four judges, expressed grave reservations about key aspects of Justice
O'Connor's vision of diluted due process. The July 7, 2004 Order does
not apply to Hamdi, who has subsequently been released in Saudi
Arabia, because it only applies to foreign nationals being held as enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay. Nevertheless,
it is clearly inspired by
175
Hamdi.
in
plurality
O'Connor's
Justice
prepare the record of the Tribunal within three working days of the
announcement of the Tribunal's decision. The record shall include those items
described in paragraph (g)(3) above. The record will then be forwarded to the
Staff Judge Advocate for the Convening Authority, who shall review the record
for legal sufficiency and make a recommendation to the Convening Authority.
The Convening Authority shall review the Tribunal's decision and, in
accordance with this Order and any implementing instructions issued by the
Secretary of the Navy, may return the record to the Tribunal for further
proceedings or approve the decision and take appropriate action.
i. Non-Enemy Combatant Determination. If the Tribunal determines that the
detainee shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant, the written report
of its decision shall be forwarded directly to the Secretary of Defense or his
designee. The Secretary or his designee shall so advise the Secretary of State,
in order to permit the Secretary of State to coordinate the transfer of the
detainee for release to the detainee's country of citizenship or other disposition
consistent with domestic and international obligations and the foreign policy of
the United States.
j. This Order is intended solely to improve management within the Department
of Defense concerning its detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base, Cuba, and is not intended to, and does not, create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law, in equity, or otherwise by
any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities
or entities, its officers, employees or agents, or any other person.
k. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to limit, impair, or otherwise affect
the constitutional authority of the President as Commander in Chief or any
authority granted by statute to the President or the Secretary of Defense.
This Order is effective immediately.
174. A senior defense official at a July 7, 2004 background briefing explained: "In
response to last week's decisions by the Supreme Court, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
today issued an order creating procedures establishing a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal with notice of the basis for their detention and an opportunity for them to
contest their detention as enemy combatants ....
The tribunal will decide whether there
is-will decide whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the detention of the
individual as an enemy combatant. And as provided for-as suggested by Justice
O'Connor's opinion in the Hamdi case, there will be a rebuttable presumption in favor of
the government's evidence, but the detainee will be able to have an opportunity to rebut
that presumption."
News Transcript at www.defencelink.mil/transcripts/2004/
tr20040797-098 1.html.
175. The influence of the O'Connor opinion about what process was due may suggest
that the decision was not a minimalist decision that decided only what was necessary to
decide the case. For a defense of constitutional minimalism in the national security
context see Case Sunstein, Minimalism at War, SUPREME CT. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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The July 7, 2004 Order 176 provides that detainees shall be provided
with a "personal representative" to assist them in the combatant status
review proceedings and that the representative, a military officer with an
appropriate security clearance, shall be afforded access to "any
reasonably available information" in the possession of the Department of
Defense. The personal representative is not a lawyer and is instructed to
inform the detainee that "none of the information you provide me shall
be held in
confidence and I may be obliged to divulge it at the
'1 77
hearing."

The tribunals are to be composed of "three neutral commissioned
officers of the U.S. Armed Forces" who have no previous involvement
with the detainee and who decide the case on the basis of majority vote.
The detainee is to be provided "in advance of the proceedings with notice
of the unclassified factual basis for the detainee's designation as an
enemy combatant." With the assistance of an interpreter if necessary, the
detainee can attend the hearings, except for the hearing of "other matters
that would compromise national security if held in the presence of the
detainee" and the tribunal's deliberations and voting. The detainee can
testify but cannot be compelled to do so. He may call witnesses "if
176. The Combatant Status Review Order is distinct from the military order that
authorizes the detention and trial of certain non-citizens in the war against terrorism. See
Military Order of Nov 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918; 66 Fed Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001). For
an analysis of how this order deviates from standard court martials because of the
absence of pretrial hearings, by allowing trial panels as opposed to judges decide
questions of law, by allowing sentencing on a two-third votes, by denying access to any
judicial review, and by departing from criminal rules of evidence to a greater extent than
court martials, see Note, David Glazier, "Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal:
Judging the 21s Century Military Commission," 89 VA. L. REv. 1954, at 2016-17. For a
decision holding that the Military Commission Order is also inconsistent with the
standards of justice required by court martials, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 8 Nov. 2004
(D.C. Dist Ct.). Judge Robertson found in that case that the unavailability of judicial
review of the military commissions by five civilian judges of the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces with possible further review by the Supreme Court of the United States
was not fatal. He did, however, suggest that the possible exclusion of the detainee from
the hearing for reasons of national security violated the Confrontation Clause and the
right to be present at trial. The judge stated that counsel for the detainee "made the
unrefuted assertion at oral argument that Hamdan has already been excluded from the
voir dire process that 'the government's already indicated that for two days of his trial, he
won't be there. And they'll put on the evidence at that point.... .' Counsel's appropriate
concern is not only for the established right of his client to be present at his trial, but also
for the adequacy of the defense he can provide to his client. The relationship between the
right to be present and the adequacy of defence is recognized by military courts, which
have interpreted Article 39 of the UCMK in light of the Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence." At p.39 slip judgment. As will be seen, the military commission process
is in many respects more respectful of the rights of the detainee than the combatant status
review process that is discussed in this paper.
177. Secretary of the Navy, July 29, 2004 Memorandum Enclosure 3 "Personal
Representative Qualifications, Roles and Responsibilities."
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reasonably available" and "in the case of witnesses who are not
reasonably available, written statements, preferably sworn, may be
submitted and considered as evidence. The Tribunal is not bound by the
rules of evidence such as would apply in a court of law. .

.

. At the

discretion of the Tribunal, for example, it may consider hearsay
evidence, taking into account the reliability of such evidence in the
circumstances."
Finally and perhaps most importantly: "Preponderance of evidence
shall be the standard used in reaching [the determination of whether the
detainee is properly detained as an enemy combatant], but there shall be
a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government's evidence." An
enemy combatant is defined in the July 7 Order to be "an individual who
was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces
that are engaged
in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
8
partners."

17

3. Combatant Status Review Hearings and the Risk of Error and
Miscarriages of Justice
Many of the rules established by the July 7 Order run significant
risks of erroneous determinations of whether the detainee in fact satisfies
the above definition of an enemy combatant. The risk of error produced
by these rules is relevant in determining whether they satisfy standards of
due process under Mathews v. Eldridge.1 79 In what follows, the main
organizational and evidential shortcomings of the combatant status
review tribunal rules will be examined in relation to the risk of
wrongfully classifying people as enemy combatants.
a.

Standard and Burden of Proof

One of the most important structural features of any legal
proceeding is the standard and burden of proof. Such matters are a
concrete manifestation of society's willingness to run a risk of error and
whether the risk of error will be born by society at large or by the
affected individual. Under the combatant status review tribunal rules, a
civil standard of proof is required as opposed to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. This creates a danger that, in cases of uncertainty
about whether the detainee is an enemy combatant, the doubts will be
settled in the government's favor. This is particularly true when the civil
standard of proof is coupled with a presumption in favor of the
178. Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal, 7 July 2004 in
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy from Deputy Secretary of Defense.
179. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Government's evidence. This effectively places the accused in a position
of having to establish that he is not an enemy combatant. The
presumption may be said to reflect the fact that the detentions of enemy
combatants have already been subject to internal reviews by the
Department of Defense. Nevertheless, the concept of tunnel vision is
very helpful in pointing out the potential weaknesses in such a review
process. In the absence of adversarial challenge, even the criminal
justice system may disregard evidence of innocence and focus on
affirming a case that has already been made. A legal presumption in
favor of the government's evidence can be seen as a legal affirmation of
tunnel vision, whereas the reasonable doubt standard used in criminal
trials invites decision-makers to consider alternatives to the
government's theory of the case.
b.

Disclosure and Tunnel Vision

As examined in the first part of this paper, lack of disclosure is a
major cause of miscarriages of justice. Under the July 7 Order, personal
representatives of the detainees are only entitled to disclosure of "any
reasonably available information in the possession of the Department of
Defense that may be relevant to a determination of the detainee's
designation as an enemy combatant." The requirement in the order that
only reasonable available evidence be disclosed runs a risk that
exculpatory evidence might not be disclosed.
The reference in the order to disclosure of "records, determinations
or reports generated in connection with earlier determinations or
reviews" runs another related and perhaps even greater risk that has been
highlighted in recent examinations of wrongful convictions; namely the
risk that Department of Defense, like police forces in many criminal
cases of wrongful convictions, could develop "tunnel vision" in which
only inculpatory evidence is gathered and ambiguous or exculpatory
evidence is either ignored or interpreted in a manner that supports a
preconception that the detainee is an enemy combatant. In a recent case
in which two terrorism charges were dismissed against Arab immigrants
in Detroit, the judge commented that prosecutors who had earlier worked
on the case had developed a theory that the men were an al Qaeda sleeper
cell "and then simply ignored or avoided any evidence or information
which contradicted or undermined the view."' 80 If such tunnel vision can
occur in a criminal prosecution, it can certainly occur with respect to a
less adversarial and less public process of military detention. The danger
of tunnel vision is aggravated by prior statements and determinations in
180.

Danny Hakim, Judge Reverses Convictions in Detroit Terrorism Case N.Y.

TIMES, 3 Sept. 2004.
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the chain of command from the President down that concluded that the
Guantanamo detainees were enemy combatants and dangerous people.
c.

Adversarial Challenge and Personal Representatives

One
defense.
however,
"personal

possible check on tunnel vision is a vigorous, well prepared
In the case of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals,
the detainee is not represented by a lawyer, but rather by a
representative" who is a military officer with a security
clearance. The fact that the representative has a security clearance may
produce some benefits for the detainee because the military order
contemplates that the personal representative may have access to
classified information that is disclosed by the Department of Defense or
discussed by the Tribunal when the detainee is not present.1 81 In this
way, the order contemplates an arrangement that is somewhat similar to
that used in a Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in the
United Kingdom in which a security cleared Special Advocate has access
to classified information that cannot be disclosed to the detainee and his
lawyers. Neither the Special Advocate in the United Kingdom or the
personal representative in Guantanamo can share classified information
with the detainee.
In some respects, allowing a security-cleared advocate or personal
representative to challenge the government's case can favorably be
contrasted with the security certificate process under Canadian
immigration law that was examined above.
Under the Canadian
procedure, confidential and classified information is considered in a
closed court where the detainee and his lawyer are not present and no
one acts as an adversary to the government's position. The Canadian
courts have, however, expressed great confidence in the fairness of the
state in presenting its evidence and the ability of the judge to probe and
test the state's case. 82 Nevertheless, judges in the Anglo-American
system are not trained to be inquisitorial investigators and there is a
181. The order provides that: "The detainee shall be allowed to attend all proceedings,
except for proceedings involving deliberation and voting by the members or testimony
and other matters that would compromise national security if held in the presence of the
detainee.
The detainee's personal representative shall be allowed to attend all
proceedings, except for proceedings involving deliberation and voting by the members of
the Tribunal."
182. Decary and Letourneau J.A. stress that "the designated judge plays a pro-active
role in the interest of ensuring fairness ... while there is no denying that it is harder for
the appellant to test the validity and credibility of information that is not disclosed to him,
the fact is that he is assisted in this task by the designated judge who has the heavy
responsibility of maintaining a balance between the parties and accordingly respect for
the principles of fundamental justice." Charkaoui v. Canada,supra note 134, paras. 80,
82.

2005]

MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE IN THE WAR AGAINST TERROR

1023

benefit to exposing the government's case to adversarial challenge. In
this respect, the quality of the adversary is important. Under the British
system, Special Advocates are senior and well respected barristers who
are independent from the government and can and have resigned when
they conclude that they cannot do their jobs properly. In contrast, under
the July 7 Order, personal representatives are military officers subject to
the chain of command and, in many cases, without legal training.
The personal representative under the Guantanamo Combatant
Status Review Tribunal rules is not a lawyer and his or her
communications with the detainee are not covered by attorney-client
privilege. This is not spelled out in the order, but rather in a subsequent
explanatory memo. It advises the personal representative to tell the
detainee the following: "I am neither a lawyer nor your advocate, but
have been given the responsibility of assisting your preparation for the
hearing. None of the information you provide me shall be held in
confidence and I may be obliged to divulge it at the hearing. ' One of
the main rationales for attorney-client privilege is to allow the client to
make full disclosure to his or her lawyer in order to assist with the
defense. A detainee given the above warning may well be reticent to tell
his full story to the personal representative. This is a crucial shortcoming
in terrorism cases in which a detainee will often be asked to explain why
they associated with certain persons or why informants who may or may
not be prior acquaintances have told the government that the detainee is a
terrorist.
A shortcoming of the personal representative procedure, as well as
the British Special Advocate procedure, is that the detainee is not in a
position to fully instruct his or her representative who is in a position to
challenge the government's case against the detainee.
This is a
significant in the terrorism context because the detainee may have
information about his associates and his home country that a Special
Advocate may not have.
In a recent decision holding that the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals did not provide due process, Judge Green concluded that a
personal representative under the rules:
[I]s neither a lawyer nor an advocate and thus cannot be considered
an effective surrogate to compensate for a detainee's inability to
personally review and contest classified evidence against him. ...
Additionally, there is no confidential relationship between the
detainee and the Personal Representative, and the Personal
Representative is obligated to disclose to the tribunal any relevant
183.

Secretary of the Navy Memo Implementation of Combatant Status Review

Tribunal, July 29, 2004.
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inculpatory information he obtains from the detainee....
Consequently, there is inherent risk and little corresponding benefit
should the detainee
decide to use the services of the Personal
84
Representative.
Judge Green contrasts the use of personal representatives under the
combatant status review tribunal rules with the ability of lawyers in both
habeas cases and under military commission rules to obtain security
clearances and access to classified information, even while they are
prohibited from disclosing such evidence to their clients. She cited one
combatant status review case in which a personal representative made no
request for further inquiry regarding classified but presumably
questionable evidence and concluded that in this case "clearly, the
presence of counsel for the detainee, even one who could not disclose
classified evidence to his client, would have ensured a fairer process in
this matter by highlighting weaknesses in evidence considered by the
tribunal and helping to ensure that erroneous decisions were not made
regarding the detainee's 'enemy combatant' status."' 185 Defence lawyers
with access to classified information would undoubtedly be in a better
position to challenge the government's case that a detainee is an enemy
combatant than personal representatives who are military officers.
Nevertheless, the quality of adversarial challenge of the government's
case will be degraded to the extent that either defence lawyers or special
advocates are not allowed to disclose classified information to the
detainee in order to hear the detainee's side of the story.
d.

Trial by Military Officers

The tribunals determine whether the detainee is an enemy
combatant on the basis of the majority of three US military officers who
have not previously been involved in the detention, interrogation or
previous determination of the detainee's status.
Although the no
previous involvement with the detainee rule is an attempt to ensure some
degree of impartiality, military officers appointed by the Secretary of the
Navy on an ad hoc basis do not enjoy judicial independence. One of the
lessons of the Irish cases and other cases of wrongful convictions is that
even independent judges may succumb to defending a justice system of
which they are a part of when confronted with a miscarriage of justice
that may have seen the innocent imprisoned for years. If judges
sometimes behave in this manner, it is possible that military officers may
even more strongly believe that they are part of a system that is placed on

184. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, supra note 15 Jan. 31, 2005 at 54 of
unclassified
185.

slip judgment (U.S.D.C. for the District of Columbia).

Id. at 54.
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trial by claims of innocence.
Military officers presiding at the tribunals may be risk adverse and
err on the side of continued detention in doubtful cases. The Convening
Authority of the tribunals, Secretary of the Navy England, has argued
that twelve of 200 people released from Guantanamo "have indeed
returned to terrorism" and explained that this makes the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals "a very difficult process ... we don't want to
let people out who will come back, fight and kill Americans or anyone
else in the world; at the same time, we are trying to strike the right
balance in terms of their rights and their freedoms. So it is not without
risk."' 186 The record of low "acquittal" rates at the enemy combatant
hearings suggests that it may be the detainees who are bearing the risk of
continued detention in cases of ambiguity. Moreover, it is an error to
blame the twelve alleged false negatives on the combatant status review
process. Indeed, it might be possible that an absence of full process in
those cases may have played a role in the determination to release. In
other words, inadequate process can contribute to false negatives as well
as false positives. Similar concerns in the criminal justice field have led
some to stress that miscarriages of justice not only punish the innocent,
but allow the guilty to go free.
There are structural features of the combatant status review tribunal
that may also produce a risk of risk aversion in deciding whether a
person is an enemy combatant. The majority rule decision allows a
person to be confirmed as an enemy combatant even though one of the
three officers determines otherwise. Although the jury system is not free
from majoritarian bias, it at least has the potential to empower dissenters.
Unlike a court, the combatant status review tribunals do not appear
to have the ability to simply release their own decision. Rather their
decisions are reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy who is the
convening authority who then "may return the record to the Tribunal for
further proceedings or approve the decision and take appropriate action."
At the same time, it could be argued that in the case of the Tribunal
finding that the detainee is not in fact an enemy combatant that the order
provides for direct transmittal of the decision to the Secretary of Defense
who is then obliged to advise the Secretary of State "in order to permit
the Secretary of State to coordinate the transfer of the detainee for release
to the detainee's country of citizenship or other disposition consistent
with domestic and international obligations and the foreign policy of the
187
United States."'
186. Special Defense Department Briefing on Status of Military Tribunals, Dec, 20,
2004
available at www.defenselink.mil/srch/docView?c=A3B245203F9EBEC5
FC8C8C306E4AAF 152F.
187. July 7 Order, supra note 173, at i.
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The Use of Interpreters

The July 7 Order provides that the detainee "shall be provided with
an interpreter, if necessary." An interpreter is obviously necessary to
ensure that the detainee who cannot understand English can participate in
hearings and the Guantanamo hearings provide a challenge given the
wide range of languages spoken by the detainees. What is not known is
how many hearings were conducted without a translator because the
detainee was judged to have sufficient facility in English. The Canadian
experience of miscarriages of justice suggests that those who understand
English as a second, third or fourth language may still be at a
disadvantage when they testify in that language. In one Canadian
wrongful conviction, an Aboriginal accused who could understand
English testified in English. The inquiry examining his wrongful
conviction found that the person's hesitant manner of speech may have
contributed to a jury decision to reject the credibility of his evidence. At
a subsequent public inquiry, the now exonerated person was allowed to
that this
testify in his native language and the judges commented
188
favorably affected their perception of his testimony.
f.

Trial in Absentia

Another issue for the tribunals is trial in absentia. The Convening
Authority indicated that 292 detainees have participated in 507
combatant status reviews hearings conducted as of December 20,
2004.189 This suggests that a large number of the hearings have been
held without the detainee being willing or able to participate even though
initial reports by the Convening Authority suggested that 90-95% of the
detainees originally expressed interest in the hearings. 90 This raises the
possibility that hundreds of detainees may have voted with their feet and
refused to participate in hearings that they believed could not assist them.
One factor in such a decision could have been information conveyed to
the detainees that what they told their personal representative was not
confidential. Another factor could be knowledge that the detainee will be
excluded from the hearing when classified information is considered and
that the personal representatives will be unable to inform the detainee
about the classified information. It may be that many detainees in
188. Nova Scotia Royal Commission on the DonaldMarshall Jr. Prosecution (1989)
at 171-173.
189. Special Defence Department Briefing on Status of Military Tribunals, Dec. 20,
2004 available at www.defenselink.mil/srch/docView?c=A3B245203F9EBEC5FC8C
8C306E4AAF 152F.

190. Sec. Nav. Briefs on Review Tribunals 16 July 2004 www.defenscelink.mil/
transcripts/2004/tr20040716-1006.html.
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Guantanamo are making rational decisions not to participate in the
hearings. In any event, the fact that over 40% of the combatant status
review tribunal hearings at Guantanamo have been trials in absentia with
only the detainee's personal representative being present to challenge the
government's case may have increased the risk of erroneous
determinations.
g.

The Pace of the Hearings

Although the need for speed in conducting the combatant status
review hearings is understandable given that detainees have already in
many cases been detained for years, the speed in which the combatant
status review hearings were conducted is also problematic. One factor
that may contribute to wrongful convictions is if the defense does not
have adequate time to prepare. Even more disturbing is the schedule for
the hearings which were that each panel of three officers would conduct
four hearings a day, six days a week.1 9 1 The speed and summary nature
of the hearings is revealed by the fact that 550 tribunals were conducted
at Guantanamo between July 30, 2004 and January 19, 2005.192
Routinized assembly-line justice also increases the risk of erroneous
determinations.
h.

Reduced Rights for Detainees to Call Evidence

The detainee is only allowed to call and question witnesses that are
"reasonably available." Witnesses in the U.S. Armed Forces are deemed
not to be reasonably available if their commanders determine that "their
presence at a hearing would affect combat or support operations." In one
report by the American Forces Press Service, a detainee accused of
serving with the Taliban requested that three witnesses be called to
testify that he had forcibly been taken from his family and forced to join
the Taliban. This request was denied by the President of the Board on
the basis that the issue of consent and intent was not relevant given the
definition of an enemy combatant and the limited scope of the
hearings. 193 The premature removal of the alleged combatants from the
battlefield and the isolated location of Guantanamo Bay suggest that the
right of the detainees in the July 7 order to call witnesses in their defense

191. Secretary of the Navy England Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal 9
July 2004 at www.defenscelink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr200040709-0986.html.
192. "Combatant Status Review Tribunal Update" 19 Jan 2005 at
www.defenselink.mil/srch/docView?c=A3B245203F9EREC5FC8C306E4AAF 152F.
193. Kathleen Rhem, "Reporters offered Look Inside Combatant Status Review
Tribunals," Aug. 29, 2004, American Forces Information Service News Articles.
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is illusory. 194
i.

No Disclosure of National Security Information to Detainees

Another restriction on the combatant status review tribunal is that it
does not have the authority to declassify national security information or
allow the detainee to have access to such information. Because both the
officers and the personal representatives have security clearances, they
can see the information, but this information must be introduced and
reviewed without the detainee being present or being able to make
submissions about its accuracy. The danger of nondisclosure to the
detainee is particularly acute in terrorism as opposed to other cases
because much evidence about terrorism will come from intelligence
sources of unknown reliability. Indeed as discussed in the first part of
this paper, terrorism cases often blur the distinction between
circumstantial evidence and intelligence.
In her decision holding that the combatant status review tribunal
rules violated due process, Judge Green stressed the "inherent lack of
fairness of the CSRT's consideration of classified information not
disclosed to the detainees." She cited a tribunal transcript from thee case
of Mustafa Ait Idr who, after being informed that the government alleged
he had associated with a known Al Qaeda operative while living in
Bosnia, tried to ask the following pertinent questions.
Detainee: Give me his name.
Tribunal President: I do not know.
Detainee: How can I respond to this?
Tribunal President: Did you know of anybody that was a member of
Al Qaeda?
Detainee: No, no ....

This is something the interrogators told me a

long while ago. I asked the interrogators to tell me who this person
194. When asked about the ability of a detainee to call a witness in another country
such as Pakistan, Secretary of the Navy England replied that in some cases "maybe you
don't" allow witnesses to be called. "It may not be reasonably possible to do it. So you
have to look at the preponderance of the evidence and decide, gee, if-let's just say he
came and gave that testimony. How would that stack up against all the other data.
You're not going to be able to find all the people that people may call out .... you're not
going to be able to just bring in anybody from every-from anywhere. You're not going
to be able to find everybody. But you do what's reasonably possible in each case."
Secretary of the Navy England Briefing on Combatant Status Review Tribunal 9 July
2004 at www.defencelink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr200040709-0986.html.
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was. Then I could tell you if I might have known this person, but not
if this person is a terrorist. Maybe I knew this person as a friend.
Maybe it was a person that worked with me. Maybe it was a person
that was on my team. But I do not know if this person is Bosnian,
Indian or whatever. If you tell me the name, then I can respond and
defend myself against this accusation.
Tribunal President: We are asking you the questions and we need
you to respond to what is on the unclassified summary.195
This exchange demonstrates how evidence of perhaps innocent
associations are important components of many terrorism cases. As
discussed in the first part of this paper, the Maguire Seven were
wrongfully convicted of involvement with the IRA in large part because
of their associations with members of the Guildford Four, also
wrongfully convicted. The Maguire Seven knew who was falsely
implicating them, but under the combatant status review tribunal rules,
Mustafa Ait Idr does not even know the name of the terrorist he is
alleged to have associated with in Bosnia. Decisions to classify evidence
linking detainees to terrorism deprive them of the opportunity to
challenge the credibility and significance of the evidence, to place it into
the political context of their home country and to challenge the
government's case against them.
j.

The Use of Hearsay Evidence

Another evidential limitation in the combatant status review tribunal
is that the admissibility of hearsay evidence may prevent the detainee or
his personal representative from cross-examining those who provide
evidence to the tribunal. The order provides that the tribunal "shall be
free to consider any information it deems relevant and helpful to a
resolution of the issue before it" and that this may include hearsay
evidence. The tribunal is directed to take "into account the reliability of
such evidence in the circumstances." Hearsay evidence may in particular
be used in the case of witnesses who are determined not to be reasonably
available. Indeed, the order contemplates that in such cases "written
statements, preferably sworn, may be submitted and considered as
evidence." Such evidence, however, would not be subject to crossexamination. The detainee or personal representative would be denied
an opportunity to ask questions that could raise doubts or discredit the
reliability of the evidence or inquire into other matters of the witnesses.
Written evidence from military personal not subject to cross195. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, supra note 15 Jan. 31, 2005 at 54 of
unclassified slip judgment (U.S.D.C. for the District of Columbia).at 47-48.
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examination may appear more reliable than it should and could
perpetuate tunnel vision which ignores or discounts contradictions and
ambiguities in the evidence. Another possible factor might be perjury
that may be more easily disguised and accepted as truth when not subject
to cross-examination. As discussed in the first part of this paper, police
perjury was a factor in some of the Irish terrorism cases. The danger of
"noble cause" corruption may be greater in both the terrorism and war
contexts where discriminatory stereotypes about the enemy and notions
of collective guilt may be strong. In addition, the war context may also
produce a belief that the ends of the cause justify deceptive or less than
truthful means.
k.

Evidence Obtained Through Torture or Extreme Interrogation

The admissibility of hearsay evidence also raises the prospect that
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals may have considered
confessions or other incriminating statements from other detainees that
may have been obtained under extreme circumstances. As discussed in
the first part of this paper, extreme interrogation cases in the Irish
terrorism cases in the United Kingdom in the 1970s produced both false
confessions and false incriminating statements. Nothing on the face of
the July 7 Order requires the tribunal to determine whether confessions
from the detainee were obtained voluntarily or under duress. The
controversy over interrogation tactics used and authorized at various
times at Guantanamo is well known, but the focus for our purposes is on
the risk that they produced unreliable evidence. One case has emerged in
which three men falsely confessed to having been at a meeting between
Mohamed Atta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackers, and bin Laden in
Afghanistan after detention and interrogation at Guantanamo. 196 The
Combatant Status Review Tribunals composed of American military
officials who have been instructed by the July 7 Order to presume in
favor of their government's information seem to be a most unlikely
forum to challenge the reliability of confessions and incriminating
statements that may have been obtained under situations of extreme
duress and even torture.
In her decision holding that the combatant status review tribunal
rules violated due process, Judge Green stressed that the connection
between the requirement that incriminating statements be voluntary with
the requirement that evidence be reliable. Without deciding the truth of
the allegations on the preliminary motion to dismiss the detainees'
habeas application, she cited allegations that some of the detainees had
196. Neil Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Case,
2003-05 CATO SuP. CT. REv. 49, 65.
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been tortured abroad and at Guantanamo. She then concluded that "at a
minimum ...due process requires a thorough inquiry into the accuracy
and reliability of statements alleged to have been obtained through
torture."'1 97 Unlike many of the academic discussions of the use of
torture in terrorism case, Judge Green's approach to the torture reflects
an appropriate judicial concern about reliability and the possible
detention and punishment of the innocent.
1.

The "Acquittal" Rate

The above analysis is not meant to suggest that the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals have been of no value at all. In early September
2004, the Pentagon announced that it would return one of the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay to his home country after he was determined by a
Combatant Status Tribunal not to be an enemy combatant as defined in
the Order. Few details were provided about the proceeding, but it was
announced that the detainee found not to be an enemy combatant did not
call any witnesses.' 98 It thus appears as if the proceeding simply had the
effect of forcing the government to reevaluate its previous decision that
the man who was captured in Afghanistan in May 2002 was an enemy
combatant. As of January, 2005 there were only three findings that a
detainee was not a enemy combatant out of then 330 finalized hearings.
Since that time, the acquittal rate has increased and as of March, 2005
there were thirty-five more findings that a detainee was not an enemy
combatant for a total of thirty-eight such findings of 558 finalized
tribunals.' 99 In the vast majority of cases, the tribunals have quickly
confirmed the Department of Defense's previous findings that the
detainee is an enemy combatant. In the cases that have led to adverse
findings, the result and subsequent releases can perhaps be attributed
more to a proper internal review by the military, as opposed to a full
200
adversarial challenge to the military's case.
197. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, supra note 15 Jan. 31, 2005 at 54 of
unclassified slip judgment (U.S.D.C. for the District of Columbia at 56, citing Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964).
198. Pentagon says GuantanamoPrisonerImproperly Held, REUTERS, 8 Sept. 2004.
199. "Combatant Status Review Tribunal Summary" at www.defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2005/d2005O329csrt.pdf The reasons for the increase in findings that detainees were
not enemy combatants after January of 2005 are speculative. One hypothesis would be
that the more difficult cases were held till the end. Another hypothesis would be that the
tribunals were more likely to hold that the detainees were not enemy combatant after the
government began more actively to assert its rights to repatriate detainees back to their
home countries. See Judge Limits the Transfer of 13 from Guantanamo New York Times
March 30, 2005 A14..
200. On the importance of adversarial challenges of the government's case in the
terrorism context, see Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: PoliticalEthics in an Age of
Terror (2004).
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Summary

The above analysis has suggested that important organizational
choices have been made in the construction of the combatant status
review tribunals at Guantanamo that assign a significant risk of
erroneous determinations on to the detainee.
The most dramatic
examples are the assignment of a rebuttable presumption in favour of the
government's evidence, the use of a civil standard of proof, the use of
personal representatives as opposed to lawyers to help the detainee make
his case, the failure to disclose classified information to detainees, the
practical inability of detainees to call evidence in their own defence and
reliance on information of questionable reliability in the government's
case against the detainees.
Even on the limited information that is available to the public, it
appears that some innocent people have been detained as suspected
terrorists in recent years. The most well known example is probably the
Oregon lawyer Brandon Mayfield who was detained for about two weeks
under a material witness warrant before the FBI admitted that they had
made a mistake in connecting him with the Madrid bombings. It is ironic
that the most well-known case concerns a white American lawyer
detained for a short period of time and not the largely nameless and
faceless persons who are detained at Guantanamo Bay or detained under
immigration laws for much longer periods. Nevertheless, there is good
reason to believe that some innocent people have been and are likely still
detained in the current war against terrorism. Because these people have
not been subject to criminal trial, however, they may not be recognized
as the wrongfully convicted. This is a triumph of form over substance
and it diminishes the pride that democratic governments should take in
only punishing the guilty and not harming the innocent. Democracies
should only punish the guilty; it is terrorists who punish the innocent.
Judge Hand once complained that the criminal law was "haunted by
the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream., 20 1 It is
now widely accepted that the innocent man convicted is a disturbingly
real presence in the criminal justice system. There are good reasons to
believe that some innocent people have also been caught in the war
against terrorism. The remaining question is whether we are paying
adequate attention to the innocent who may not be convicted because
they may never even have an opportunity to have a criminal trial.
IV.

What is a Miscarriage of Justice in a Post-September 11 World?
The above sections have advanced the argument that we should be

201.

United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (1923).
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concerned about the possibility of miscarriages of justice stemming from
false allegations of terrorism. We have suggested that miscarriages of
justice may be both more likely in terrorism cases and more corrosive to
the integrity of justice, in part because the risks of wrongful accusations
of terrorism are not distributed equally in society but fall
disproportionately on various religious, racial and political minorities.
The last section has also suggested that the dangers of imprisoning the
factually innocent since the terrorist attacks of September 11 are by no
means limited to the context of the criminal trial. Many suspected
terrorists have been imprisoned under immigration laws, material witness
warrants and military orders since September 11. Indeed, the numbers of
those detained under non-criminal laws is probably considerably greater
than the number of suspected terrorists who have been or are in the
process of being prosecuted under criminal laws. We must not forget the
lessons of the Irish cases about the risks of wrongful conviction in
terrorism cases, but we must also be sensitive to how the problem of
imprisoning the innocent may change as the nature of terrorism and of
the war against terrorism changes.
This takes us back to the classificatory problem of what should be
recognized as a miscarriage of justice. The language of miscarriage of
justice is emotive and is generally considered to belong solely to the
realm of criminal justice, involving the most serious of errors or a
wrongful conviction. Claims of wrongful convictions are a potent
political force; miscarriages of justices are public problems that can go to
the top of the political agenda and command attention across the political
spectrum. 202
The example of Illinois' experience with wrongful
convictions and Governor Ryan's moratorium on capital punishment are
but one example of the political power of claims of wrongful
convictions. The wrongful convictions in the Irish cases in the United
Kingdom led to public inquiries examining the criminal justice system
and the eventual creation of a new body, the Criminal Cases Review
Commission, to examine claims of miscarriages of justice.20 3 In Canada,
there have already been three major public inquiries into cases of
wrongful convictions and two others are ongoing. Moreover, the
Supreme Court of Canada has cited wrongful convictions in Canada, the
United States and the United Kingdom as a major justification for a new
constitutional rule that prohibits the extradition of fugitives without
assurances that the death penalty will not be applied.20 4 Concerns about
202. JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, THE CULTURE OF PUBLIC PROBLEMS: DRINKING, DRIVING
AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER (1981).
203.

A. James, The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Economy, Effectiveness and

Justice, 2000 CRIM. L. REV. 140.
204. United States ofAmerica v. Burns and Rafay, 1 S.C.R. 283 (2001).
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wrongful convictions and the punishment of the innocent have played a
unique and powerful role that has led to some reconsideration of some of
the excesses of the criminal justice system.
A crucial issue in the future of anti-terrorism efforts is whether they
are conducted on a war model, a crime model or something in between.
As the last section of this paper has suggested, governments have
frequently abandoned the restraints of the criminal law model and have
detained terrorist suspects under immigration and military law. Does this
shift of focus mean that innocence and the widely held and powerful
concern about the imprisonment of the innocent falls off the table? Can
governments avoid justice concerns about innocence and the political
problems that accompany the detention of the innocent simply by
selecting procedures that do not result in formal determinations of guilt
and innocence? As suggested above, we take a more substantive
approach to this issue that focuses on the dangers of imprisoning the
innocent regardless of whether detention is authorized by military or
immigration law as opposed to criminal law. Governments should not be
able to escape the type of public criticism and revulsion that
accompanies wrongful convictions simply by opting out of the criminal
law and using short cuts that avoid the difficulties of a criminal trial.
The discussion in the preceding section suggests that there is an urgent
need to reconsider the ambit of the public problem of miscarriages of
justice in light of the way that the war against terrorism is being
conducted.
The proper definition of miscarriages of justice is a thorny and
difficult one. A definition that is too restrictive runs the risk of missing
important facets of injustice. At the same time, too broad a definition of
miscarriages devalues the currency of the term and the instinctive
revulsion and sense of unquestionable injustice that accompanies the
imprisonment of the innocent. Claims of miscarriage of justice have a
bi-partisan political salience that should appeal to both those disposed to
crime control and due process models of the criminal process, as well as
of these models
to those who want justice for crime victims because all
05
ofjustice are set back when the innocent are punished.1
One end of the spectrum of miscarriages of justice is clearly
occupied by cases of inconvertible factual innocence of the type provided
by DNA exonerations after criminal convictions. 0 6 A slightly less
restrictive definition is one that includes only cases "in which innocence
205.

HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION,

Part II, (Stanford

U.P. 1968); K. Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY

206.

671 (1999).

BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN
JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2001).
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is established beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 °7 Such approaches are,
however, much too restrictive in the terrorism context. DNA will rarely
be a factor in terrorism cases.2 °s In addition, the role of overconfident
predictions of scientific tracing of explosive residue in the Irish cases
examined in the first part of this paper counsels against overconfident
reliance on science either to convict or to exonerate the accused in
terrorism cases. 20 9 Terrorism cases will often involve complex forms of
accomplice and conspiracy liability as well as circumstantial evidence
linking people with others and causes. Uncertainty about the facts may
be a persistent feature in many terrorism cases.
At the other end of the spectrum is a definition of miscarriages of
justice that encompasses all rights violations and injustices whether
suffered by those accused of crimes or victims of crimes. Clive Walker
has provided a broad taxonomy of different types of miscarriages of
justice, summarized in the following passage:
A miscarriage occurs as follows: whenever suspects or defendants or
convicts are treated by the State in breach of their rights, whether
because of, first, deficient processes or, second, the laws which are
applied to them or, third, because there is no factual justification for
the applied treatment or punishment; fourth, whenever suspects or
defendants or convicts are treated adversely by the State to a
disproportionate extent in comparison with the need to protect the
rights of others; fifth, whenever the rights of others are not effectively
or proportionately protected or vindicated
by State action against
210
wrongdoers, or sixth, by State law itself.

207. C. Ronald Huff, Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1
(2002).
208. In a case holding that it will generally violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedom to extradite a person without assurances that the death penalty will not be
applied, the Supreme Court of Canada stressed that not all miscarriages of justice can be
discovered through DNA evidence. It stated, "there is always the potential that
eyewitnesses will get it wrong, either innocently or .... purposefully in order to shift the
blame onto another. And there is always the chance that the judicial system will fail an
accused ... the concern about wrongful convictions is unlikely to be resolved by
advances in the forensic sciences, welcome as those advantages are, from the perspective
of protecting the innocent and punishing the guilty." United States of America v. Burns
and Rafay at para 116.
209. Gary Edmond, Constructing Miscarriages of Justice: Misunderstanding
Scientific Evidence in High Profile CriminalAppeals, 22 O.J.L.S. 53 (2002).
210. Clive Walker, Miscarriagesof Justice in Principle and Practice,in C. WALKER
AND K. STARMER, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR (1999) at
33. For other broad definitions of miscarriages of justice that are, however, restricted to
errors of criminal justice see Steven Greer Miscarriages of Justice Reconsidered 57 Mod
.L.R. 58 (1994); Michael Naughton "Redefining Miscarriages of Justice: A Revived
Human-Rights Approach to Unearth Subjugated Discourses of Wrongful Criminal
Conviction" 45 British J. of Criminology 165 (2005).
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Although Professor Walker's rights-based definition of miscarriages of
justice has been contested by some writers, 211 and we eventually
conclude that it is too broad, it has some definite virtues in a post 9/11
world. Walker's definition is written in a generic manner that is not
necessarily tied to criminal convictions. Although he does not address
this application directly when presenting the above definition, his
expansive test for miscarriages of justice might be related to his expertise
in British anti-terrorism laws, including the use of preventive internment
in Northern Ireland that was not tied to criminal convictions." 2
Walker's definition quite properly, in our view, does not limit
miscarriages of justice to wrongful convictions and includes procedural
shortcuts that allow for detention without a criminal trial.
Another virtue of Walker's definition is that it locates miscarriages
of justice, not only in practices that result in the conviction of the
innocent, but also in substantive laws that produce those risks. As
suggested in part one of this paper, broad new anti-terrorism laws run a
risk of encouraging the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of
innocent associates of terrorists. As discussed in part two of this paper,
the order establishing combatant status review tribunals at Guantanamo,
inspired by Justice O'Connor's plurality judgment in Hamdi, runs the
risk of inaccurate determinations of guilt by providing for reverse
burdens, hearsay evidence and presumptions in favor of the
government's evidence.
Despite its virtue in focusing on the substantive issue of detention
and paying attention to the content of the law authorizing detentions,
Walker's definition of a miscarriage of justice seems overbroad and
indeterminate in other respects. For example, Walker's definition seems
to include even brief periods of unfair detention in the streets as a
miscarriage of justice,2 13 and in doing so risks expanding what should be
a powerful label and conclusion to encompass all due process violations.
2 11.

In commenting on an earlier but similar definition of miscarriages of justice

provided by Professor Walker, David Schiff and Richard Nobles argued that "this

definition raises more questions than it answers. What rights? What is disproportionate
adverse treatment? When are the rights of others not properly protected?" They go on to
argue that the "actual link" between factors such as "unjust laws" and "failure to protect
individuals against actions by criminals and vigilantes" and "miscarriages of justice
remain tenuous." Nobles & Schiff, Book Review 34 BRIT. J. OF CRIM. 383, 383-384
(1994).
212. GERARD W. HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN
IRELAND (Manchester U.P. 1989).

213. Professor Walker suggests that "disproportionate treatment in terms of rights
might include the granting of arrest or extensive search power" could qualify as a
miscarriage of justice, but then excludes detention without proper cause "to keep the list
manageable and to focus on the cases involving the greatest damage to rights and
illustrating best the failure of process inherent in the term 'miscarriage."' Walker
Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice, supra note 39 at 35, 45 n.I 10.
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Walker's definition is also overbroad in the sense that it seems to apply
to all state practices and laws that violate rights or have a
disproportionate disadvantaging effect on rights.
Not all rights
violations, however, generate the same response as the conviction of the
innocent. In addition, Professor Walker expands the definition even
more by including crime victims as potential victims of miscarriages of
justice when he includes state actions and laws that do not effectively or
proportionately protect or vindicate wrongdoers. Although justice for
victims is an important topic in its own right, 2 14 in our view, it is not
helpful to include it under the rubric of miscarriages of justice. In a
liberal society, the imprisonment of the innocent has a special
significance that is different from a failure to respect victims or vindicate
their interests or rights.
In the end we would adopt a narrower definition of miscarriages of
justice than Professor Walker but one that, like his definition, is not
limited to wrongful convictions in criminal trials. In our view, concerns
about miscarriages of justice should be triggered whenever a person is
detained in a manner that does not provide sufficient safeguards for the
determination of whether the criteria for detention accurately apply to
that person. In other words, our focus is on factual innocence as defined
by the relevant law whether that be the law of war, immigration law or
criminal trials. 5 Our focus is then on whether laws and practices with
respect to detention and trial provide adequate procedures and evidential
safeguards in order to ensure that only those who satisfy the substantive
criteria of the law are detained.
For present purposes and with some reluctance, we would not go as
far as Walker in including laws that may be substantively unjust in our
definition of a miscarriage of justice.1 6 Rather our focus is on laws that
214. KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE NEW LAW AND POLITICS
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1999); MARKUS DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE
AND ABUSE OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS (2002).
215. This definition could also apply to commitments of the mentally ill to the extent
that procedures used in that context may run a high risk of detaining those who do not
meet the relevant criteria for detention. In this context, the United States Supreme Court
has held that due process requires minimal procedural fairness. See Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 413 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980). We are indebted to Professor Chris Slobogin for this point.
216. Professor Walker includes "inherently unjust laws" within his definition of a
miscarriage of justice, as well as laws that are "inherently unfair to victims." Id. at 34,
37. Stephen Greer has identified "anti-terrorist criminal justices processes" that have
"reduced standards of proof' and "weakened rights for suspects and defendants" as a
source of miscarriages of justice. Greer "Miscarriages of Justice Reconsidered," supra
note 210 at 68-69. Professor Greer's definition focuses less than Professor Walker's on
the substantive justice of the anti-terrorism laws. Professor Greer, like ourselves, focuses
more on procedures, including procedural rights, that are used in determining whether an
anti-terrorism law applies to a particular person rather than the injustice of perhaps

1038

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

because of minimal procedural and evidential standards produce a
serious risk of detaining those who are innocent under the terms of the
relevant law that authorizes detention or punishment.' 17 We recognize
that in the terrorism context, there is a strong case for following Walker
in including detention under unjust laws that violate rights as a
miscarriage of justice. For example, the definition of enemy combatants
in the July 7 order as those who supported the Taliban or al Qaeda can be
criticized for not following international standards of the law of war and
Judge Green has recently suggested that the definition may be
overbroad. 1 8 Similarly, some would argue that the detention of people
who are only suspected of terrorism or are only members of terrorist
groups is also substantively unjust. 219 Nevertheless, we believe that a
focus on factual innocence under the law as written should be a matter of
concern to both those who share substantive concerns about the
definition of terrorism and those who do not.
Another problem that may not be adequately addressed under either
our definition or Walker's definition is the pretextual use of the law and
especially immigration law. Thus one governmental tactic is to detain
terrorist suspects not on the basis of their involvement with terrorism, but
because they may be factually liable under some other law, such as the
violation of a visa requirement.
Our relatively thin definition of a miscarriage of justice runs the risk
of not engaging with the substantive justice of laws that authorize
detention and perhaps even obliquely legitimating the detention of those
who are factually guilty under expansive laws that authorize the
detention of those who are enemy combatants, terrorist suspects or
overbroad definitions of terrorism.
217. It should be noted that Professor Walker opposes a focus on matters of proof and
evidence as "one of the shallowest definitions [of miscarriages of justice] imaginable"
because it ignores questions of the substantive justice of laws and because "matters of
evidence and proof' are not "self-evident and self-contained ... evidence and proof
should reflect rights rather than the reverse." Ibid at 42. Although questions such as
whether silence can be used as evidence of guilt does, as Walker suggests, reflect rights,
it is also possible that some laws such as the orders for combatant status review tribunals
are so deficient with respect to procedure and evidence that one can confidently conclude
that they will result in inaccurate application of the relevant legal standards for detention,
standards which may or may not be substantively unjust.
218. Judge Green noted that the definition of enemy combatant in the order was
broader than the definition considered in Hamdi and suggested that due process would be
violated should the definition allow the indefinite detention of a person "solely because
of his contacts with individuals or organizations tied to terrorism and not because of any
terrorist activities that the detainees aided, abetted, or undertook himself. In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Jan. 31, 2005, at 64, supra note 15 (U.S.D.C. for the
District of Columbia).
219. Kent Roach, The Anti-Terrorism Act and the Three Year Review, U.N.B.L.J.
(forthcoming); Roach SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA ch.4 (2003).
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members of terrorist groups. It also may not address the problem of
pretextual detentions. Nevertheless, our definition harnesses the widely
held revulsion at the imprisonment of those who are innocent and speaks
directly to those who may not share doubts about the substantive justice
of the underlying law. Our definition of a miscarriage of justice would
also encompass laws such as the status combatant review tribunal orders
that provide inadequate procedural and evidential protections for the
determination of whether a detainee satisfies the relevant definition of an
enemy combatant or the Canadian security certificate process which
affords inadequate adversarial protection in determining whether a noncitizen is a member of a terrorist group. Like Walker's definition, our
definition would apply to both practices and laws that provide inadequate
safeguards for the accurate determination of guilt and violate the rights
of the accused not to be imprisoned for something that he did not do.
The focus would not, however, be on unjust laws per se, but rather on
laws that provide inadequate protections against the risk of detention that
is not authorized by law. Such an approach is not meant in any way to
displace criticisms of the substantive justice of the underlying laws or to
suggest that the detention of people who satisfy the criteria of the
relevant law is legitimate. Rather our goal is to suggest that more
attention should be paid to the danger of detaining those who may be
innocent under the broad range of laws that are being used in the war
against terrorism.
We recognize that our definition of miscarriages of justice is
unorthodox because it transcends the traditional criminal justice
paradigm. It transplants the socially and politically emotive label of
miscarriage of justice into new territory.
However, as the state
prosecutes alleged terrorists through military and immigration law, the
protections and accountability that are delivered by criminal justice and
miscarriage of justice discourse should not be lost. The United States
Supreme Court has sometimes recognized the dangers of deprivation of
liberty even when a person is not being found guilty of a criminal
offence. 22 In addition, the risk of error is an important factor in the
Mathews v. Eldridge22 1 calculus of due process that applies to even
administrative decision-making. Deprivations of liberty occasioned by
immigration and military laws have many of the same features of
traditional criminal deprivations of liberty, especially in terms of
privation, hardship, stigma and dislocation. In other words, even though
these measures might not be imposed as punishment, they are certainly
experienced in this way. Although it has been argued that censure is tied
220. In the bail context, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), Schall v. Martin,
467 U.S. 253 (1984), U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
221. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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to findings of criminal guilt,222 we should be sensitive to how even
censure may occur when people are designated as terrorists under
military and immigration law. Our understandings of what constitutes a
miscarriage of justice in terrorism cases should evolve to take into
account both the deprivations caused by military and immigration
detention of alleged terrorists and the self-interest of governments in
using military and immigration law as a shortcut for incapacitating and
punishing suspected terrorists.
V.

Conclusion

Prior to 9/11, the desire to apprehend, try and punish those
responsible for acts of terrorism presented special challenges for the
criminal justice system, well illustrated by the experience in England
with the Irish cases that resulted in the wrongful conviction of the
Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven and Judith
Ward. These cases demonstrated the frailties of the Western world's
most vaunted fact-finding mechanism-the criminal trial. The Irish
cases shook the confidence of a system that had been shockingly
complacent about the risk of punishing the innocent and confirmed the
suspicions of many about discrimination against the Irish in British
society. Once revealed, the wrongful convictions constituted a serious
stain on British efforts against terrorism, imposed very serious harms on
the innocent and allowed the guilty to escape conviction.
In a post 9/11 world, the war on terrorism continues to rely on the
criminal prosecution as an important weapon. The criminal cases in
Germany suggest that some lessons, such as the need for full disclosure
of the prosecution's case to the accused, may have been learned from the
Irish cases. At the same time, these lessons make it more difficult to
obtain criminal convictions in terrorism cases. The costs and obstacles
involved in addressing terrorism through the criminal process have sent
governments in search of new, more efficient and less public and
demanding methods to detain suspected terrorists.
The shift of cases typically claimed by the criminal justice system
into areas of the law that deliver fewer substantive and procedural rights
to the detained citizen, expose more individuals to great risks of
detention without a full adversarial process to determine whether they
actually are terrorists. Transferring terrorism cases from the criminal law
to immigration law or the laws of war should not obscure the intimate
links between detention as a terrorist and a fair and accurate
determination of individual responsibility for real and apprehended acts
222.
1993).

See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTION (Oxford U. P.,
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of violence against civilians.
We should recognize the importance of not only determining
individual responsibility, but also the increased danger of error in
determining this responsibility at times of great public alarm and hostility
towards those who share racial, ethnic or political ties with those who
commit horrendous acts of terrorism. History tells us that the war on
terrorism makes our criminal process more fallible. Common sense
suggests that, by fighting what are in reality criminal cases outside of the
rights-protective criminal process, we exponentially increase the risk of
serious miscarriages of justice while at the same time not producing
criminal convictions that might be subsequently revealed as wrongful
convictions. Miscarriages of justice in all terrorism cases should be a
much greater cause of concern because the risks of such miscarriages are
not evenly distributed in society and because miscarriages once revealed
can erode the high ground that democracies that only punish the guilty
should have in the war against terror.

